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THE DIGNITY CANON
Noah B. Lindell*
Human dignity is not a freestanding constitutional right, but it is a
strongly held constitutional value. To this point, however, human dignity
has had no place in statutory interpretation. This Article argues that
courts should create a dignity canon of interpretation, which would op-
erate as a clear statement rule. If laws are to be construed to limit indi-
vidual dignity, the legislature must expressly this plainly. By conducting
re-dos of three Supreme Court cases in the areas of civil rights, criminal
procedure, and personal health, the Article shows the promise of the dig-
nity canon.
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INTRODUCTION
On the final day of the October 2014 Term, the United States Su-
preme Court issued its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.' This momen-
tous decision, which enshrined into the Constitution an equal right to
marry for homosexual and heterosexual couples, 2 based its reasoning on
a synergistic combination of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 However, as several scholars
have noted, an even deeper value underlay the decision: human dignity.4
Dignity is a notoriously slippery concept.5 It sounds in themes of
equality, autonomy, and basic humanity. 6 It connotes something both air-
ily ephemeral and deeply visceral. Yet the Court seems quite comfortable
invoking this vague idea in its opinions. The Obergefell decision was
freighted with nods to dignity; it cast gay marriage bans as "con-
demn[ing] [homosexuals] to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civ-
ilization's oldest institutions."7 In its peroration, the Court said of the
plaintiffs: "They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Consti-
tution grants them that right."8
1 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2 Id. at 2604-05.
3 Id. at 2604.
4 See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Cooper, The Power of Dignity, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 3, 15
(2015); Jack B. Harrison, At Long Last Marriage, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 1, 53
(2015); Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of Marriage, 6
CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 107, 109 (2015); see also Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions,
and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1745, 1757 (2015) (saying that "[m]aybe today, 'due
process' leads some of us to think in terms of 'dignity,"' and citing Obergefell).
5 See Hunter, supra note 4, at 109.
6 See Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 YALE
L.J. 1732, 1739 (2014).
7 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
8 Id.
THE DIGNITY CANON
A great many legal scholars have examined the concept of dignity
as it appears in constitutional cases like Obergefell.9 Dignity has even
received attention as it relates to administrative law.1o This Article asks a
different question: should the courts incorporate dignity into their statu-
tory interpretation jurisprudence?" And if so, how? The judiciary, I ar-
gue, not only can include dignitary concerns in its statutory interpretation
decisions; it should do so. The most efficient and effective way to do this
is to develop a new rule of interpretation: the dignity canon. This Article
explores the notion of human dignity and explains how it can be applied
to legislative interpretation.
Part I examines the idea of human dignity in constitutional law.
Though not a constitutional right in and of itself, dignity has long been a
settled constitutional value.1 2 It has informed the interpretation of a wide
range of constitutional issues, and its use has risen under the Roberts
Court. Part I explores dignity's status in constitutional law, provides a
definition of dignity, and examines the wide domain in which dignity
operates.
Part II argues that this strong tradition of dignity jurisprudence
should extend to statutory cases, through the creation of a dignity canon
of interpretation. Like many other constitutionally derived canons, this
proposed dignity canon would act as a clear statement rule. The rule
would require that a legislature speak clearly if it wishes to pass a provi-
sion that would diminish individuals' intrinsic worth as human beings.
Part II makes the case for this rule, and takes on several arguments
against creating a new dignity canon.
9 See, e.g., 3 BRUCE AcICEIUWAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 137
(2014); AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT 185-208 (Daniel Karyos trans., 2015); Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurispru-
dence of Dignity, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 169, 171-73 (2011); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the
Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694,
1735-36 (2008); Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and Same-Sex Marriage, 123
Yale L.J. 3076, 3082-88 (2014); sources cited supra note 4 and infra note 12.
10 See Bayefsky, supra note 6, at 1735-41.
11 A few scholars have begun nibbling around the edges of this question. See Johanna
Kalb, Litigating Dignity: A Human Rights Framework, 74 ALB. L. REv. 1725, 1735 (2011)
(discussing ways to "advance human rights-based dignitary claims" in statutory and common-
law cases); William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions
of Justice Stevens, 1989 Duke L.J. 1087, 1137 (1989) (explaining the jurisprudence of Justice
Stevens, who, Popkin claimed, took "an approach to statutory interpretation that defer[ed] to
legislative language, yet also show[ed] concern for case-by-case adjudication and individual
dignity").
12 See Lufs Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contem-
porary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 331, 346-47
(2012); Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 65, 93 (2011);
Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in
Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1921, 1934 (2003).
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Part HI lays out how the dignity canon would operate in real-world
situations. A clear statement rule in favor of dignity could have a signifi-
cant effect on issues ranging from criminal justice and the death penalty,
to discrimination, to health care and abortion rights. Part 11 reimagines
three important Supreme Court cases--Romer v. Evans,13 Muscarello v.
United States,14 and Harris v. McRae' 5-to show how replacing the
Court's reasoning with a dignity canon analysis would affect the out-
come. Through these case studies, Part III shows that a dignity canon can
be applied in a principled manner, and that it is not merely an ideological
tool for those on either side of the aisle.
Finally, Part IV discusses an important limitation on the proposed
dignity canon: the contested idea of dignity itself. The dignity canon,
based as it is on the constitutional commitment to dignity, is subject to
the same vicissitudes of ideology that roil constitutional law. One promi-
nent example of this limitation is affirmative action. Those who view
affirmative action as dignity-affirming would read statutes so as to limit
restrictions on the practice; those who see the Constitution as color-blind,
on the other hand, would interpret statutes so as to limit affirmative ac-
tion itself. Part IV recognizes this problem, but argues that judges can
prevent its importation into statutory cases by following the contours of
these very constitutional contests. Even with this potential pitfall, the
dignity canon has the potential to transform many areas of statutory
law-and transform them for the better.
I. DIGNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT
The concept of dignity has an uncertain place in the constitutional
firmament. It is not obvious from any particular provision of the Consti-
tution that dignity plays a role in constitutional interpretation. Yet both
courts and scholars have enmeshed the concept into their arguments,
claiming that a concern for human dignity underlies certain constitutional
rights-or even that "dignity is the motivating force behind the whole
Constitution itself."16 Indeed, Justice Potter Stewart said that "the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being" is "a concept at the root of
any decent system of ordered liberty."' 7 And Justice William Brennan
described the Constitution as "a sublime oration on the dignity of man, a
bold commitment by a people to the ideal of libertarian dignity protected
through law."' 8 Hyperbolic as some of these statements might appear,
13 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
14 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
15 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
16 Glensy, supra note 12, at 93.
17 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
18 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifica-
tion, 27 S. TEX. L. REv. 433, 438 (1986).
THE DIGNITY CANON
they illustrate a broader truth: human dignity has become a foundational
part of American constitutional jurisprudence.
This Part explores the controversy and the case law surrounding the
Constitution's protection of human dignity. Part L.A will lay out the de-
bate over dignity's legal status. As we will see, both Justices and scholars
continue to contest the idea of human dignity and its proper scope in
constitutional jurisprudence. However, dignity's existence as a key con-
stitutional value is now a matter of settled law. Part L.A will also provide
a working definition of human dignity, one that is tethered both to com-
mon usage and longstanding constitutional doctrine. Part I.B will then
examine the areas of law in which the Court has most robustly embraced
a dignity interest: civil rights and discrimination, criminal law and proce-
dure, and personal health and privacy. By scrutinizing dignity's domain,
we can see the three main ways in which the federal or state governments
could unconstitutionally intrude on human dignity. In particular, we will
see that legislatures may not pass statutes that (1) single out one group
for worse treatment or lesser protection, (2) sanction treatment of indi-
viduals that fails to meet minimum adequacy standards, or (3) unduly
limit individual autonomy.
A. Dignity's Status
Over the past seven decades, Supreme Court opinions have ad-
vanced a steady--if at times "fragmented and undevel-
oped"-jurisprudence of human dignity.19 The concept of dignity
entered the constitutional lexicon in the early days of the Republic. 20
Since then, the Supreme Court has mentioned the word "dignity" in over
900 cases, 2 1 referring to everything from "the dignity of the court," 22 to
"the dignity of the sovereign," 2 3 to "the dignity of records." 2 4 But it was
in the 1940s, in the shadow of World War II and the horrors of the Holo-
caust, that the Court truly began to embrace individual human dignity in
19 BARAK, supra note 9, at 193, 206.
20 See Chisholn v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 455 (1793) (Wilson, J.) ("A State; useful and
valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity
derives all its acquired importance."); see also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 632 (1896)
(Field, J., dissenting) ("[B]oth the safeguard of the constitution and the common-law rule
[against forced self-incrimination] spring alike from that sentiment of personal self-respect,
liberty, independence, and dignity which has inhabited the breasts of English-speaking peoples
for centuries.").
21 Resnik & Suk, supra note 12, at 1933. A Westlaw search on February 17, 2017 of
Supreme Court opinions using the word "dignity" returned 945 cases-though some make no
substantive use of dignity. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Dignity Health, 136 S. Ct. 873 (2016);
Hernandez v. Dignity Health, 136 S. Ct. 526 (2015); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249
(2006) (discussing Oregon Death with Dignity Act).
22 Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 165 (1965).
23 The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 123 (1812).
24 Hooper v. Scheimer, 64 U.S. 235, 240 (1859).
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constitutional interpretation.25 Justice Brennan was a particularly prolific
proponent of human dignity as a constitutional value, invoking the con-
cept in thirty-nine opinions during his tenure on the Court.26 Dignity has
since remained a potent concept in constitutional interpretation: Justices
Thurgood Marshall, 27 Sandra Day O'Connor,2 8 and John Paul Stevens 29
occasionally paid homage to dignity in their opinions, and Justice
Anthony Kennedy has championed its use in a range of cases.30
So where does dignity stand today? The first thing to note is that
dignity is not a constitutional right. As Justice Clarence Thomas pointed
out in his Obergefell dissent, "the Constitution contains no 'dignity'
Clause."3 1 The Court has never recognized a direct right to dignity.32 Yet
it is just as clear that dignity is a constitutional value.33 As Justice Ste-
phen Breyer puts it: "Values are the constitutional analogue of statutory
purposes." 34 They are not in the text of the document, but they tell us
why the text is there and what the text is meant to protect. And many
parts of the Constitution, the Court has said, are meant to protect human
dignity.
The Court has explicitly held that certain constitutional provisions,
such as the Eighth Amendment, were designed as dignitary guarantees.3 5
More broadly, the Court has spoken of "the Constitution's protection of
human dignity," 36 acknowledging dignity as a fundamental value that is
25 BARAK, supra note 9, at 193-94.
26 Henry, supra note 9, at 171.
27 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635-36, 640-41 (1989);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 576-77, 589-90 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 541, 605 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-78, 181-82
(1984) (O'Connor, J.).
29 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727, 743-44 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Casey, 505 U.S. at 916, 920; Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 589-90,
593-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 232-34 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
30 For instance, Justice Kennedy wrote most of the recent decisions on homosexuality
and the death penalty cited below. See infra notes 67-70, 92. Anne Jelliff attributes Justice
Kennedy's use of dignity at least in part to his Catholicism. See Anne Jelliff, Catholic Values,
Human Dignity, and the Moral Law in the United States Supreme Court: Justice Anthony
Kennedy's Approach to the Constitution, 76 ALB. L. REV. 335, 349 (2013).
31 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
32 Cf id. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Petitioners do not contend that their States'
marriage laws violate an enumerated constitutional right, such as the freedom of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. There is, after all, no 'Companionship and Understanding' or
'Nobility and Dignity' Clause in the Constitution.").
33 See, e.g., Henry, supra note 9, at 181.
34 STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEw 162 (2010).
35 See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014).
36 Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 2001.
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infused throughout our governing document. As we will see in Part II.B,
this more diffuse existence-living implicitly in many clauses rather
than explicitly in one-means that dignity remains under-enforced in
constitutional law. This is a classic situation in which courts tend to cre-
ate and use policy-based canons of statutory interpretation.37
Several conservative Justices, particularly Clarence Thomas and
Antonin Scalia, have resisted the ever-growing jurisprudence on dignity.
These Justices have repeatedly questioned the Court's very use of the
term, as well as broader doctrines-such as the Eighth Amendment's
"evolving standards of decency" test-that are rooted in dignity.38 In
Obergefell, Justices Thomas and Scalia rejected the very idea of constitu-
tionalized dignity. 39 To them, dignity is an innate human characteristic:
"The government cannot bestow dignity, and it cannot take it away." 40
Dignity is simply beyond the power of the legal system to protect or
destroy. Some scholars have joined the Justices in their criticism. 4 1
Yet even these Justices are willing to employ dignity when it suits
them. For instance, Chief Justice Stephen Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
joined the majority opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp, in the course of
which the Court reaffirmed that the Eighth Amendment is rooted in the
"dignity of man." 42 And Chief Justice John Roberts' opinion in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1,
which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Samuel Alito joined, said that the use
of race in school assignment "demeans the dignity and worth of a per-
son." 4 3 Even when they have opposed its use, the skeptics have been
unable to convince the Court to abandon or confine its dignity jurispru-
dence. Indeed, dignity has not only been on the rise under the Roberts
Court; it is also increasingly appearing in majority, as opposed to concur-
ring or dissenting, opinions." As the next Section lays out in greater
37 See infra Part II.B. L
38 See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983 (1992) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (calling the majority's use of the words "dignity and autonomy" part of an
empty "collection of adjectives").
39 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Death with Dignity and the Sanctity of Life, in A TIME TO BE
BORN AND A TIE To DIE: THE ETmIcs OF CHOICE 117, 133 (Barry S. Kogan ed., 1991);
Michael Rosen, Dignity: The Case Against, in UNDERSTANDING HuMAN DIGNITY 143, 146
(Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013); Jonathan Turley, The Trouble With the 'Dignity' of Same-
Sex Marriage, Wash. Post (July 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
trouble-with-the-dignity-of-same-sex-marriage/2015/07/02/43bd8f70- 1f4e- 11 e5-aeb9-
a41 1a84c9d55_story.html; David Upham, Symposium: A Tremendous Defeat for "We the Peo-
ple" and Our Posterity, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015, 4:26 PM), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2015/06/symposium-a-tremendous-defeat-for-we-the-people-and-our-posterity.
42 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).
43 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007).
44 Henry, supra note 9, at 171-72.
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detail, dignity plays a broad-and extremely durable-role in constitu-
tional doctrine.
While dignity's status as a constitutional value is essentially settled,
its basic meaning is less clear. On the face of it, human dignity is an
exceptionally malleable concept. It has elements of both equality and
adequacy of treatment.45 A violation of one's dignity could consist of
anything from humiliation, to a reduction of legal status, to the abstract
idea of "being treated as a 'mere means' instead of an end in itself." 46
This pliability suggests that dignity's meaning evolves. Indeed, Justice
Aharon Barak claims that "dignity is a relative concept, dependent upon
historical, cultural, religious, social and political contexts." 47
But this does not mean that dignity is unusable in constitutional or
statutory cases. In fact, dignity has maintained a relatively consistent
meaning over at least the past century. For example, the 1933 edition of
the Oxford English Dictionary defines "dignity" as "[t]he quality of be-
ing worthy or honorable; worthiness, worth, nobleness, excellence." 48
The 2002 edition of Webster's Third defines it as "[t]he quality or state
of being worthy; intrinsic worth." 49 A number of other dictionaries from
the period in between give similar definitions.50 All of these dictionaries
focus on the concept of inherent worth-the idea that we all possess
some quantum of spirit as human beings that commands a certain degree
of respect. The Court's view echoes these dictionary definitions: protect-
ing dignity requires the State to "treat its members with respect for their
intrinsic worth as human beings." 5 '
45 Bayefsky, supra note 6, at 1739.
46 Id.; see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans., 1998) (1785) ("In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a
dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other
hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity.").
47 BARAK, supra note 9, at 6.
48 Dignity, OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (reprint 1961) (1933).
49 Dignity, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE UNABRIDGED (2002).
50 See, e.g., Dignity, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(3d ed. 1992) ("1. The quality or state of being worthy of esteem or respect. 2. Inherent nobil-
ity and worth."); Dignity, FUNK & WAGNALLS STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE: INTERNATIONAL EDITION (1963) (fourth definition) ("The state or quality of being
excellent, worthy, or honorable."); Dignity, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE
AMERICAN LANGUAGE: ENCYCLOPEDIC EDITION (1951) ("1. worthiness; nobility.... 3. the
degree of worth, repute, or honor.").
51 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); see, e.g.,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (equating "human
dignity" with "inherent worth"); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) ("[lIt demeans
the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit
and essential qualities."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (stating that
"the essential dignity and worth of every human being" is "at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty").
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This gets us closer to a working definition of human dignity, but the
idea of preserving one's intrinsic worth is not precise enough on its own
to support a canon of statutory interpretation. This is where the Court's
case law comes into play. As we will see in the next Section, the Court
has employed dignity in a wide range of cases; from these cases we can
delineate three core principles that give dignity a more definite shape.
First, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses evince a commit-
ment to "equal dignity." 52 This means that a government cannot single
out groups for special burdens or lesser protections, or provide individu-
als with significantly unequal rights. Second, dignity contains an element
of adequacy. There is a certain minimum level of treatment that the state
and federal governments must provide to all human beings, including to
suspected criminals and prisoners.5 3 And third, the Court's substantive
due process jurisprudence adds a liberty component to dignity. A govern-
ment cannot pass laws that significantly intrude on traditional areas of
personal autonomy or otherwise impede people's ability to make certain
private decisions for themselves.5 4
These three principles make the otherwise vague concept of dignity
more concrete. They also set needed limits on how courts could use dig-
nity in statutory interpretation. I argue in Part II.B that dignity, like many
other constitutional values, should enter statutory interpretation through
the creation of a clear statement rule. Such rules require clear language in
the text of a statute before courts will read it to intrude on important
principles of judicial policy. A dignity clear statement rule, therefore,
would provide a prophylactic that goes somewhat beyond the Constitu-
tion itself. However, it would not be able to go beyond the principles just
articulated, unless the Court further broadens its constitutional dignity
jurisprudence. Nor would it provide protection where the Court has ex-
plicitly ruled that the Constitution does not. For instance, one might as-
sume that the concept of equal dignity would prevent states from
providing more money to students in wealthy suburban school districts
than to poor urban ones. But in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the Constitution does not provide a
right to education, and that it does not require equality of school funding
on the basis of community wealth.5 5 Courts might still interpret statutes
to provide a minimum, adequate level of education; 56 but courts could
not read ambiguous laws to require equality of funding. These limitations
52 See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 95-106 and accompanying text.
55 411 U.S. 1, 35, 54 (1973).
56 See id. at 36.
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will keep in check what could otherwise be a worryingly expansive
concept.
Finally, it should be noted that the constitutional dignity value di-
rectly enhances individual liberty, sometimes in unexpected ways. As we
will see from the case studies in Part II, transferring dignity into the
statutory realm does not necessarily serve a particular political agenda.
The Court's dignity jurisprudence often expands individual rights in a
traditionally "progressive" way,57 but civil liberties are not inherently
liberal as a political matter. The Roberts Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence, for example, has embraced a form of "conservative libertarian-
ism," 5 8 even as it invokes "individual dignity" to justify loosening
restrictions on speech. 59 Dignity means that we all have intrinsic worth,
which the government cannot constitutionally deny or abridge. This is,
one would hope, a nonpartisan idea.
B. Dignity's Domain
As noted in the previous Section, the Court has not confined dignity
to one particular constitutional provision, or to a single line of doctrine.
To the contrary: dignity has played a role in a number of disparate areas
of law. One scholar has determined that the Court has invoked dignity in
relation to nine of the twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution.60
This Section focuses on three areas: civil rights, criminal procedure, and
personal health. These are the fields in which dignity jurisprudence is the
most developed-and they will form the basis for the case studies in Part
In.
On the civil rights front, the Court has found dignity lurking in a
broad array of doctrines. It has declared that employing peremptory
strikes on the basis of gender violates the dignity of the excluded ju-
rors, 6 1 and that classifying individuals by race "is inconsistent with the
dignity of individuals in our society." 62 It has said that robust First
Amendment debate protects the "individual dignity and choice upon
57 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
58 Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 117 W. VA. L. REv. 231, 236 (2014).
59 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
60 Henry, supra note 9, at 173.
61 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994); id at 153 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
62 Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see id. at 746 (plural-
ity opinion); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000).
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which our political system rests," 6 3 and that the fundamental nature of
the right to vote manifests itself in "the equal dignity owed to each
voter." 64 Justices have found that everything from free exercise of relig-
ion65 to the Americans With Disabilities Act6 6 enhances human dignity.
Within the field of civil rights, the Court has most consistently in-
voked dignity in its series of decisions on gay rights. These
cases-beginning with Lawrence v. TexaS6 7 and continuing with United
States v. Windsor6 8 and Obergefell v. Hodges69 -recognized the dignity
of gay people as individuals, and the dignity that inheres in romantic and
sexual relationships regardless of sexual orientation. 70 Both Windsor and
Obergefell seem to focus as much on the dignity of marriage itself as on
the dignity of the actual plaintiffs who sought marital recognition.7 1
Whether future gay rights decisions will focus as much on dignity when
something other than marriage is at stake, therefore, remains to be seen.72
But the sexual orientation cases recognize as part of due process liberty
"certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, in-
cluding intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs." 73
Taken as a whole, the Court's civil rights cases view dignity in two
ways: first, it protects people's ability to determine their own place in the
world; and second, it requires that government recognize the individual
63 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (plurality opinion) (quoting Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)); see also Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1636-37 (2014) (stating that America's history of racial inequality
"demands that we continue to learn, to listen, and to remain open to new approaches if we are
to aspire always to a constitutional order in which all persons are treated with fairness and
equal dignity").
6 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
65 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (Kennedy, J,
concurring).
66 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 537-38 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
67 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
68 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
69 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
70 See id. at 2597, 2599; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. Unsur-
prisingly, Justice Kennedy wrote each of these opinions. Justice Kennedy's one previous sex-
ual orientation opinion rested mainly on political process doctrine and did not mention the
dignity concept. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) ("A law declaring that in
general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from
the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.").
71 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 ("The lifelong union of a man and a woman always
has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life.");
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 ("Here the State's decision to give this class of persons the right to
marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import.").
72 See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, No. 16-111
(U.S. argued Dec. 5, 2017) (asking whether a state law that prevents a cake maker from refus-
ing to serve customers on the basis of sexual orientation violates the cake maker's free speech
and free exercise rights). Lawrence seems to provide at least some measure of comfort on this
score. See 539 U.S. at 567, 575.
73 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.
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worth of each person, which means that everyone must, at least to a cer-
tain extent, be treated equally.
In addition to civil rights, the Court has infused dignity into nearly
every step of the criminal justice system. First, it views arbitrary searches
and seizures as violating the dignity of those the government targets.74
Indeed, the Court has said that "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwar-
ranted intrusion by the State." 75 Physically or visually invasive
searches-such as blood tests or strip searches--are viewed as particu-
larly offensive to dignity, just as they are particularly harmful to personal
privacy. 76
Second, coercive police interrogation environments are seen as "de-
structive of human dignity."77 In the Court's view, the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination helps safeguard defendants' dignity, by
protecting their ability to remain silent in the face of hostile accusation.78
This dignitary interest undergirds the Miranda warning requirement for
custodial interrogations.79
Third, the Court has determined that the Sixth Amendment right to
appear pro se "exists to affirm the accused's individual dignity and au-
tonomy."80 Thus, on the one hand, states can prevent those without the
mental capacity to defend themselves from appearing pro se; this is seen
as protecting individuals' dignity, because it prevents public humilia-
tion.81 On the other hand, the Court has warned, stand-by attorneys ap-
pointed to aid pro se defendants must not "destroy the jury's perception
that the defendant is representing himself." 82 This would be as harmful to
the defendant's self-worth as would be the humiliation of a deficient pro
se defense.
Fourth, the interest in human dignity places limits on the sorts of
punishments that government may impose on criminals. As with the
Fourth Amendment, the Court has said that "[t]he basic concept underly-
ing the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."8 3
The open-ended content of the dignity value, as well as the vague lan-
guage of the Eighth Amendment itself, led directly to the Court's "evolv-
74 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989).
75 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
76 See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 346
(2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70.
77 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
78 Id. at 460.
79 Id.
80 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
81 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
82 McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178.
83 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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ing standards of decency" doctrine for cruel and unusual punishment
claims. 84
And fifth, dignity infuses even the post-conviction prison environ-
ment. The Court has determined that certain forms of treatment violate
prisoners' Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights, because "[p]risoners re-
tain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons."85 Prison over-
crowding, for instance, is unconstitutional for this reason.86
As all of this shows, the desire to protect human dignity has perme-
ated the Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence. But nowhere has the
concept of dignity been more powerfully or consistently invoked than in
death penalty cases. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman v. Geor-
gia--the case that (for four years) outlawed the death penalty-provides
a detailed argument connecting the Eighth Amendment to human dig-
nity.8 7 As Justice Brennan put it: "The State, even as it punishes, must
treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings.
A punishment is 'cruel and unusual,' therefore, if it does not comport
with human dignity."88 Examining the death penalty under a four-factor
test, Justice Brennan concluded that "the deliberate extinguishment of
human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity."89
This framing has since set the terms for the death penalty debate.
When the Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976, the plurality de-
fended the desire for retribution as not "inconsistent with our respect for
the dignity of men,"90 while the dissenters couched their responses in the
same dignity-laced language.91 More recently, the Court, led by Justice
Kennedy, has begun cutting back on the categories of crimes or defend-
84 Id. at 100-01; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S.
at 101).
85 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) ("A prison that deprives prisoners of
basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human
dignity and has no place in civilized society."). Justices have invoked dignity in other opinions
seeking to regulate prison conditions, though their views did not carry the day. See, e.g., Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 576-77 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (body-cavity searches of
pretrial detainees); id. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (prohibition on receipt of books or pack-
ages, searches of prisoners' possessions out of their presence, and body-cavity searches);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 232 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (transfers to prisons with
worse conditions without a hearing).
86 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928.
87 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 270.
89 Id. at 291; see id. at 305 ("When examined by the principles applicable under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, death stands condemned as fatally offensive to human
dignity.").
90 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (joint opinion of Stew-
art, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.).
91 Id. at 229-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 240-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ants with which the death penalty can be associated. 92 Some of the
Court's loftiest language on dignity comes from these opinions. Roper v.
Simmons declared it a "duty of the government to respect the dignity of
all persons," and elevated the preservation of dignity to the same level of
constitutional importance as federalism and the separation of powers.93
And, in Hall v. Florida, the Court declared that "[t]he Eighth Amend-
ment's protection of dignity reflects the Nation we have been, the Nation
we are, and the Nation we aspire to be." 9 4 These sentiments affirm how
foundational the concept of dignity is to constitutional law, even if it
does not represent a freestanding right. And, more generally, the Court's
criminal procedure jurisprudence shows that dignity guarantees a mini-
mum adequacy of treatment: even notorious criminals deserve basic
rights.
Finally, the Court has recognized a dignity interest in making cer-
tain decisions about one's personal health and other, similarly private
matters. These cases usually arise under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.95 In decisions dealing with abortion, 96 euthana-
sia,97 and even gun rights,98 Justices have described dignity (often paired
with the word "autonomy") as "central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."99 Just as this interest protects certain sexual
and romantic relationship choices, so too does. it guarantee the right to
make certain personal health decisions. Chief among these is the right to
terminate a pregnancy. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, the Court declared that the right to choose an abortion
is "central to personal dignity and autonomy." 0 0 However, the Court has
also recognized a countervailing interest in protecting the dignity of the
fetal life, at least in the situation of late-term abortion.' 0 '
92 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014) (defendants within margin of error
of 70 on IQ tests); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (child rape that was not
intended to and did not result in death); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 541, 578 (2005) (defend-
ants who were under 18 at time of crime); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)
(mentally retarded criminals); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (outlawing
death penalty for adult rape not leading to death).
93 Roper, 543 U.S. at 560, 578.
94 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992.
95 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
96 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920-21 (2000); Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
97 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997); id. at 779 (Souter, J., con-
curring in the judgment); id. at 743-44 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Cruzan v.
Dir., Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 879-80 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
99 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
100 Id.; see id. at 916, 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 962 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). This competing view of dignity has also been expressed in the political
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This (somewhat) ambivalent treatment of abortion is (somewhat)
similar to the Court's treatment of the right to die. In Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, the Court upheld a state law requiring
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes before allowing
surrogate decision-makers to withdraw artificial feeding tubes. 1 0 2 How-
ever, the entire Court found that patients have a due process right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment-a right based on "the patient's lib-
erty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treat-
ment."103 Seven years later, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court
found that this element of personal autonomy did not prevent states from
banning assisted suicide.M Still, several Justices thought that the right to
assisted suicide could be reformulated as the "right to die with dig-
nity,"1 0 5 and that in some cases this interest could be deemed fundamen-
tal.106 These advances, though halting, did expand the reach of the
dignity interest into the realm of end-of-life care.
These are but some of the ways in which dignity has found its way
into constitutional law. This discussion matters to the statutory interpre-
tation analysis to follow for three reasons. First, it shows that, while dig-
nity is not a freestanding constitutional right, it is a fundamental
constitutional value. Indeed, as we have seen, respect for human dignity
is one of the motivating principles behind the Fourth and Eighth Amend-
ments, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That dignity is so deeply woven into America's legal fabric helps to le-
gitimate its use in statutory interpretation. Second, dignity's grounding in
constitutional law provides some direction as to the manner in which it
may enter the statutory landscape. As we will see, constitutional values
are usually imported into statutory interpretation through clear statement
rules, presumptions that require explicit effort on the part of legislatures
world. See Taylor Wofford, Cruz on Trump Abortion Remarks: "Of Course We Shouldn't Be
Talking About Punishing Women," Newsweek (Mar. 31, 2016, 12:14 PM), http://www.news-
week.com/ted-cruz-donald-trump-abortion-comments-44275 2 (quoting presidential candidate
Ted Cruz as saying, "in response to Donald Trump's suggestion ... that women who have
abortions should face '[some] sort of punishment,'" that "we shouldn't be talking about pun-
ishing women; we should affirm their dignity and the incredible gift they have to bring life into
the world").
102 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990).
103 Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see id. at 278-79 (majority opinion); id. at 302
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 521 U.S. 702, 727-28 (1997).
105 Id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
106 Id. at 779, 789 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 744-45, 788 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at
736 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[R]espondents urge us to address the narrower question
whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitution-
ally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death. I see no
need to reach that question in the context of the facial challenges . . . here.").
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to rebut. And third, this discussion illustrates the sheer number of areas
in which dignity plays a strong role. Litigants and advocates are already
coming to recognize dignity as an important legal value-one that may
expand the rights of the downtrodden and disliked.107 A dignity canon
could tame a wide variety of harsh laws, and go at least some way to-
ward advancing American society.
II. DIGNITY AS A CANON OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
As the previous Part made clear, human dignity plays a strong role
in constitutional law. But it is quite another thing to import dignity into
the context of statutory interpretation. This Part will address the why and
the how. Part II.A will lay out the case for a dignity canon of statutory
interpretation, and refute several objections to creating such a canon. As
with other substantive canons, the dignity canon is based on a particular
vision of how courts interact with legislatures. The canon displays re-
spect for the legislative branch, by assuming that it would not wish to
intrude on constitutionally protected dignity values. At the same time, by
focusing on specifics that a legislature likely did not contemplate, the
dignity canon would both increase legislative awareness of the problem
at issue and nudge the legislators toward a more dignity-friendly legal
code. And it would do all this without the indignity of striking laws
down.
Part II.B will then connect the dignity canon back to dignity's place
as a constitutional value, asserting that this constitutional background
suggests a specific form of canon: the clear statement rule. Dignity, like
other diffuse constitutional values, is under-enforced in constitutional
law; clear statement rules provide an alternative avenue for policing leg-
islatures. A clear statement rule would also operate as a preference-elicit-
ing mechanism, forcing legislators to grapple with the dignitary
implications of the bills they debate and to consciously determine that
other factors outweigh such concerns. It would also stand alone among
clear statement rules as a protector of individual rather than structural
rights.
A. Should There Be a Dignity Canon?
Below the 30,000-foot-level battles of statutory interpretation theory
lie the "more specific doctrines of statutory interpretation," known as the
canons. 108 These are judicially-created rules of thumb about how one
107 See, e.g., Laura Rovner, Dignity and the Eighth Amendment: A New Approach to
Challenging Solitary Confinement, Am. CONST. Soc'Y 13-18 (2015), https://www.acslaw.org/
sites/default/files/Dignity-andtheEighthAmendmentL.pdf.
108 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION:
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 447 (2015).
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should interpret a statute, and are based on everything from linguistics to
common law to constitutional theory. Judges may use one, or several, of
these canons to parse a piece of text. There are three types of canons:
textual canons, which infer meaning based on word choice, syntax, and
the relationship of one set of words with other phrases in a statute; 109
substantive canons, which are presumptions about how statutes should
behave, based on constitutional values and broader policy considera-
tions; 110 and extrinsic canons, which lay out when and how judges
should use sources from outside the statute itself,' such as precedent,
legislative history, and agency interpretations.1 1 2 Glancing at these op-
tions, it is clear that the dignity canon would fall within the set of sub-
stantive canons. Like many of the other substantive canons, the dignity
canon would be based on constitutional values. It would reflect broad
policy considerations, rather than grammar or extrinsic sources of
meaning.
Before delving any further than this into the exact contours of the
dignity canon, however, it is best to pause and ask a threshold question:
should courts canonize dignity at all? This Section will lay out the main
argument in favor of creating a dignity canon of interpretation, as well as
two ancillary arguments. It will then respond to a number of counterargu-
ments. Ultimately, this Section determines that dignity has as much of a
place in statutory interpretation as it does in constitutional law. Indeed, in
the next Section we will see that it deserves somewhat more of a place in
statutory jurisprudence.
1. Arguments in Favor
There are three arguments in favor of creating a dignity canon of
interpretation. The first is the main argument; the second and third are
more minor. In Part II.B, where we consider the form that the dignity
canon would take, we will find additional strong arguments, not only for
making the dignity canon a clear statement rule, but also for creating a
dignity canon in the first place.
a. The Idealized Drafting View of Statutory Interpretation
Substantive canons are not normally based on the empirical realities
of how legislatures draft laws.1 13 Congress's awareness of these canons
109 Id. at 447-48.
110 Id. at 447.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 449.
113 See Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD.
L. REv. 791, 819 (2010).
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is mixed at best.1 14 Instead, "[t]hey represent value choices by the
Court."1 15 But the case for the dignity canon elides this distinction. The
dignity canon is based on a certain view of the work that substantive
canons do, or at least should be doing. In this telling, substantive canons
are based on a normative vision, or an idealized view, of how legislatures
would draft if they could devote the requisite attention to the issue at
hand. They assume that legislatures do not want to infringe on important
constitutional values. Not all substantive canons actually work this way;
some are pure common-law policy judgments, like the rule that bank-
ruptcy laws should be construed in favor of the debtor. 116 But the dignity
canon would work this way--and it would push legislatures toward more
liberty-protecting laws.
There is some evidence to suggest that reading statutes to comport
with human dignity would conform with drafters' expectations. Abbe
Gluck and Lisa Bressman conducted a thorough survey of congressional
drafters to determine their knowledge and use of different canons of in-
terpretation. 117 As the dignity canon would attempt to enforce constitu-
tional values, Gluck and Bressman's findings on the constitutional
avoidance canon provide some guidance as to how the dignity canon
would likely fare with drafters. It turns out that, while drafters do not
know the constitutional avoidance canon by name, they have internalized
the idea that they should write legislation to minimize potential constitu-
tional issues."18 This suggests that drafters would want to avoid a subset
of these constitutional concerns by making their laws conform to settled
standards of human dignity.
While the empirics provide some support for a dignity canon, such a
descriptive theory is not, on its own, the strongest reason to create the
canon. One does not have to show evidence that legislatures actively
consider constitutionality when drafting legislation; one only has to make
the benign assumption that legislatures would rather avoid constitutional
concerns than have their laws struck down. Certainly, this would be in a
legislature's self-interest: more of their statutes would remain on the
books, essentially intact. But for the judiciary to make this assumption is
also to display respect for a coequal branch of government. "Congress,
like [the courts], is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitu-
tion. The courts [should] therefore not lightly assume that Congress in-
114 Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the In-
side-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65
STAN. L. REv. 901, 940 (2013).
115 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 596 (1992).
116 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 114, at 940.
117 Id. at 905-06.
118 Id. at 948.
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tended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power
constitutionally forbidden it."119 This is at once a matter of judicial refe-
reeing and a display of deference to the legislature's assumed desire to
follow the Constitution.
Thus, the dignity canon is based on a vision of statutory interpreta-
tion that combines attention to the realities of legislative drafting with a
commitment to higher legal authority. In other words, the canons are
about both what is and what should be. As Guido Calabresi argues, stat-
utes will often emerge from the legislative process with less than com-
plete clarity, as a means of ensuring majority approval. 120 This being the
case, "the choice among such readings can 'honestly' be made to further
other appropriate functions of the law as determined by courts guided by
traditional principles of adjudication." 121 Perhaps the most important of
these functions is to avoid offending constitutional norms--especially
those norms, like dignity, that appear as constitutional values rather than
as concrete constitutional rights. As we will see in more detail in the next
Section, dignity is diffused throughout the Constitution rather than
tethered to one provision. This makes it less likely both that the courts
will adequately enforce it and that legislatures will pay sufficient atten-
tion to it when drafting. A dignity canon would help "'majoritarian' bod-
ies to face up to whether they really want to limit" what, like the right to
privacy, could be seen as part of "the penumbra of constitutional
guarantees." 12 2
We can also view the dignity canon as a tool to push legislatures
toward a more perfect legal code. Ronald Dworkin's "law as integrity"
theory exemplifies this vision,123 as does Justice Breyer's pragmatic
purposivism. 124 These theories view courts as partners with the legisla-
tive drafters. Judges must therefore do their part to make a statute the
best version of itself that it can be, within the parameters of what the
legislature has written.
119 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
120 Gumo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 32 (1982).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986). According to this theory, judges
looking at a statute should see themselves as authors of a chain novel, in which the legislature
has already written the first chapters. The legislature's work is of greatest importance: the
legislature is the author that develops the characters and gives the plot its shape. Id. at 313. All
future chapters must follow the path set by, and stick to the parameters outlined in, those first
chapters. A judge must then "see his own role as fundamentally the creative one of a partner
continuing to develop, in what he believes is the best way, the statutory scheme [the legisla-
ture] began." Id.
124 BREYER, supra note 34, at 100.
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On a practical level, this means that courts have to do a little bit of
what we traditionally think of as common-law judging, even in the con-
text of interpreting statutes. Of course, they should in no way ignore or
subvert the legislature's clear intent, as expressed in the law itself. But
when that intent is less than clear, courts must, to a certain extent, use
their own judgment.125 Contrary to Dworkin's idealized judicial Hercu-
les,126 real judges cannot plumb the depths of human thought and wis-
dom to determine the single best answer to this question in each case.
But they do have the expertise, and the constitutional mandate, to com-
plete a narrower task: determining how to read a particular statutory pro-
vision within the broader fabric of our legal system.1 27
What has this to do with the dignity canon? It has everything to do
with the dignity canon. 128 One does not have to buy into Dworkin or
pragmatist theory to see that judges must sometimes balance legal princi-
ples and policies when interpreting ambiguous statutory text. The sub-
stantive canons do this by bringing to bear "the interpretive conventions
that [a legislature] is obligated to consider when drafting legisla-
tion"1 29-even if the legislature did not in fact consider them in a partic-
ular case. Constitutional commands are at the top of this list.130 And, as
we have seen, dignity is one of the most deeply rooted and trans-substan-
tive values in our constitutional system. 3 1 Yet there is currently no
mechanism by which dignity can be properly considered in statutory in-
terpretation cases. The constitutional avoidance canon might provide
protection, but it tends to hone in on potential violations of concrete con-
stitutional rights.1 32 Dignity, by contrast, is a constitutional value that
lives in many provisions without finding a distinct textual home in any
one of them. Thus, when courts try to determine "which combination of
which principles and policies" best gives effect to a statutory provi-
sion,1 33 dignity is left on the sidelines. By including it in the judicial
calculus, courts can reach better-considered interpretations of statutes,
and can push legislatures to consider dignity-based harms directly when
drafting and debating bills.
Dignity also deserves a place in the statutory interpretation sphere
so that we need not rely solely on constitutional cases to enforce it. The
125 DWORKIN, supra note 123, at 338.
126 Id. at 313.
127 See CALABRESI, supra note 120, at 98.
128 Cf McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("What
has this to do with corruption? It has everything to do with corruption.").
129 Slocum, supra note 113, at 822.
130 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 598.
131 See Rovner, supra note 113.
132 See, e.g., Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory
Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 192 (2015).
133 DwoRKIN, supra note 123, at 338.
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work of Jeremy Waldron perhaps best illustrates this advantage. Waldron
argues that legislatures, because they are democratically elected and gen-
erally representative of the public, embody "the wisdom of the multitude
of the citizen body considered as a collective." 134 This wisdom, Waldron
asserts, outshines that of any smaller, unelected group of
elites-including the judiciary. 1 3 5 At first glance, this looks like an argu-
ment against the creation of a dignity canon. After all, one could argue,
mucking about with the statutes that a legislature passed impugns the
dignity of the decision the people made through their elected representa-
tives. But this dignity interest is a derivative one. The legislature is a step
removed from the people themselves; when comparing the dignity of a
piece of legislation to the dignity of the actual human beings harmed by
it, the latter wins out.
More importantly, however, the dignity canon would actually serve
the legislature-centric view that scholars like Waldron seek to promote.
To understand this counterintuitive claim, one must consider the dignity
canon not in isolation but rather in combination with the power of judi-
cial review. Some scholars believe that judicial review of legislation for
constitutional defects is "politically illegitimate"; in their estimation, ju-
dicial review privileges "majority voting among a small number of
unelected and unaccountable judges," and thereby "disenfranchises ordi-
nary citizens and brushes aside cherished principles of representation and
political equality in the final resolution of issues about rights." 13 6 Dis-
senting Justices have made the same argument in a number of recent
dignity-laced constitutional cases, including on gay marriage,1 37 the
death penalty, 38 and voting rights. 139 Any time a court strikes down leg-
islation on constitutional grounds-including as a violation of constitu-
tional dignity values-it substitutes its own judgment for the people's.
This does not mean, as these scholars and judges assert, that judicial
review is illegitimate. However, the basic point-and it is an important
one-is that our legal system must strike some sort of balance between
the legislature's judgment and the courts'. Creating a dignity canon of
statutory interpretation would provide this balance in an area where there
currently is none. As Waldron himself recognizes, "[i]t may not always
134 JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 94 (1999).
135 Id. at 93-95.
136 Jeremy Waldron, Essay, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1353 (2006); see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-18 (2d
ed. 1986).
137 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611-12 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
138 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636-39 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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be easy for legislators to see what issues of rights are embedded in a
legislative proposal brought before them; it may not always be easy for
them to envisage what issues of rights might arise from its subsequent
application." 14 0 By reading ambiguous text not to infringe on rights to
dignity, the dignity canon would illuminate for the legislature the poten-
tial constitutional pitfalls of the statutory language it chose. This would
give that legislature a chance to confront the issue, eyes open, and deter-
mine whether it favors other values over the potential for harm to dig-
nity. The dignity canon would thus lead the legislative branch toward a
more rights-conscious practice of statutory drafting, while encouraging
greater deliberation.
This latter point is as important as the former. The theory behind
legislative supremacy depends in part on "the existence of orderly dis-
cussion," centered around "an agreed text." 141 If the text is not clear as to
whether it authorizes certain conduct, and that conduct could infringe on
dignity interests, the legislature cannot properly determine whether it in
fact wants to accept the cost of such infringements. The dignity canon is
based on the assumption that, all things considered, a legislature would
prefer not to do so. "The canon is thus a means of giving effect to [legis-
lative] intent, not of subverting it."142 But, if a legislature did want to
authorize the conduct at issue, the dignity canon-unlike a constitutional
decision-would not stand in the way. The legislature could simply clar-
ify the statute to cover that conduct, now fully aware of the risk that the
law might be (though would not necessarily be) subject to constitutional
challenge. As we will see below, there are downsides to this sort of inter-
pretation-as-constitutional-avoidance method, but the positives outweigh
the negatives.
The dignity canon, then, would serve a double purpose: it would be
a valuable guarantor of rights at the statutory level, and it would also
serve as a warning signal for legislatures-one that does not come with
the indignity of constitutional invalidation.
b. The Expressive Function of a Dignity Canon
The vision of statutory interpretation outlined above provides the
main theoretical justification for creating a dignity canon. However, it is
not the only one. The canonization of human dignity would also have an
expressive function: it would tell legislatures that the courts care about
whether their laws affirm or deny dignity, and would tell individuals that
courts will help guard their dignity at the statutory as well as the consti-
140 Waldron, supra note 136, at 1370.
141 Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 664 (1995).
142 Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005); see BREYER, supra note 34, at
104.
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tutional level. This provides a benefit beyond that of the preference-guid-
ing and preference-eliciting mechanisms just discussed. Many laws serve
an expressive purpose, 143 and "[m]any people support law because of the
statements made by law."144
For instance, some commentators have disparaged Justice Ken-
nedy's Obergefell opinion for its lofty language and its alleged doctrinal
muddle.1 4 5 Its actual holding could be seen as narrow,1 4 6 even conserva-
tive.1 4 7 Yet, for the LGBTQ community, the decision had immense ex-
pressive impact. Among other things, the opinion sent a message that
"LGBT[Q] people have innate dignity that should be recognized and pro-
tected by force of law," and that "failure to do so results in impermissible
harm."1 48 Likewise, attitudes on the death penalty are often driven more
by the values projected by maintaining or eliminating that punishment
than by the legal or policy arguments for or against it. 149 A dignity canon
would not be able to fulfill this expressive purpose as well as a direct
constitutional right to dignity might, as it would be less salient to the
public. But it could still help develop a norm of equal and adequate re-
spect for individuals, which would in turn change behavior.' 5 0
c. The Dignity Canon Would Be Unremarkable
Finally, a dignity canon would be in keeping with dignity's spread
across the legal landscape, and with the already-expanding range of sub-
stantive canons. As we saw in Part I, the Court has read a dignity value
into various provisions of the Constitution. Dignity has also made its way
143 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2022-24 (1996) (providing examples).
144 Id. at 2022.
145 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628-30 & n.22 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REv.
F. 16, 16 & n.2 (2015) (describing and citing these commentators).
146 See, e.g., Kyle C. Velte, Obergefell's Expressive Promise, 6 HLRe 157, 159 (2015).
147 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, A Momentous, Yet Conservative, Win for Gay Rights,
BLOOMBERG VIEw (Dec. 21, 2015, 5:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-
12-2 1/a-momentous-yet-conservative-win-for-gay-rights.
148 Velte, supra note 146, at 164; see also Mark Walsh, A "View" From the Courtroom:
A Marriage Celebration, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015, 6:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2015/06/a-view-from-the-courtroom-a-marriage-celebration ("By 10:07, several of the
same-sex marriage advocates in the bar section are wiping away tears.").
149 See Sunstein, supra note 143, at 2022-23; Scott Vollum et al., Death Penalty Attitudes
in an Increasingly Critical Climate: Value-Expressive Support and Attitude Mutability, 5 S.W.
J. CRIM. JUST. 221, 224 (2009).
150 See Sunstein, supra note 143, at 2031; cf Sandhya Somashekhar, Georgia Governor
Vetoes Religious Freedom Bill Criticized as Anti-Gay, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/03/28/georgia-govemor-to-veto-relig-
ious-freedom-bill-criticized-as-anti-gay (describing Georgia governor's veto of a religious lib-
erties bill, in part due to "outrage from Hollywood, sports leagues and corporations for what
critics said was its discrimination against gay and transgender people.").
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into the administrative state: in 2012, the Obama Administration passed
an executive order permitting agencies to take account of human dignity
when conducting cost-benefit analyses of the rules they seek to promul-
gate.151 Adding dignity to statutory interpretation would not be a radical
innovation, but rather just another step along this existing path.
Nor is it radical to create new substantive canons. The Court does so
itself,15 2 and academics likewise have sought to swell the ranks.15 3 In-
deed, substantive canons are already in heavy use. There are over one
hundred substantive canons in existence between the federal and state
court systems. 154 In its first four Terms, the Roberts Court employed
substantive canons in 28.9% of its statutory interpretation cases.155 Given
the important role that dignity plays in many areas of constitutional law,
it deserves a place amongst the canons.
2. Three Counterarguments
While there are strong arguments in favor of creating a dignity ca-
non, there are also reasons to be hesitant. This Subsection will tackle
three of them, and explain why they should not worry judges who might
wish to import dignity into statutory analysis.
a. The "Dignity is Ideological" Argument
First, one could argue that dignity is a vague and complex concept,
one that is difficult to define and that often exists in the eye of the be-
holder. This is a common critique of dignity as a legally enforceable
value. 156 According to these skeptics, dignity is such an elastic concept
that judges will inevitably use it to reach whatever preconceived result
they like.157 To make it a constitutional value is problematic enough,
these skeptics would argue, but to attempt to interpret the work of legis-
latures based on such a vague concept would be to subject those legisla-
tures to the whims of judges. In other words, "if the Court fails to enforce
structural constitutional norms because the Constitution provides little
151 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2012); see Bayefsky, supra note 6, at
1736-37 (arguing that agencies should include dignity in cost-benefit analyses, but should not
attempt to monetize the dignitary benefits or harms).
152 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-61 (2000)
(major questions rule); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (federalism "plain state-
ment rule").
153 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REv. 69, 105 (2009)
(arguing that federal courts should employ the Democracy Canon).
154 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 114, at 940.
155 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court's First Era: An
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 Hastings L.J. 221, 236 tab. 1 (2010).
156 See, e.g., ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF
THE HUMAN PERSON 3 (2012).
157 Id.
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guidance as to their content in specific cases, how does the Court expect
to come up with [statutory interpretation] rules that are any more
principled?"158
One response to this argument is that dignity does have a fairly
well-defined application to particular areas of doctrine. Dignity underlies
the "evolving standards of decency" test for Eighth Amendment claims,
as well as the reasonableness requirement under the Fourth Amendment
and the process for defining rights under the Due Process Clause. These
tests can be, and have been, criticized on their own terms.1 59 But they do
show that dignity can undergird workable, substantive standards. Moreo-
ver, as we have seen, it is possible to determine what dignity means and
how to apply its content. There is no reason to believe that it would be
more difficult to employ dignity in statutory as opposed to constitutional
analysis.
Additionally, this would be far from the only constitutionally in-
spired canon. In fact, as shown above, "[a] good many of the substantive
canons of statutory construction are directly inspired by the Constitu-
tion." 160 And many of these other canons deal with concepts as vague
and complex as dignity-for instance, federalism,16 1 separation of pow-
ers,1 62 and the content of international law.1 63 The federalism canon, for
instance, asks whether a certain reading of a statute "would upset the
usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers." 164 The major
questions rule asks whether Congress has "assign[ed] to an agency deci-
sions of vast 'economic and political significance. "1 6 5 These standards
are hardly more concrete than the intrinsic worth standard that would
apply to the dignity canon. They may not be perfect, but they are
workable.
It is also true that the substantive canons, like other canons, are sus-
ceptible to selective usage by those who hope to bolster their favored
readings of particular statues.1 66 To some extent, this is an inherent as-
pect of statutory interpretation as a whole, just as it is an aspect of other
types of legal analysis. The possibility of bias based on preconceived
158 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 633.
159 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (crit-
icizing substantive due process doctrine); id. at 2631-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608-09 & n.1 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
evolving standards of decency test).
160 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 598.
161 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
162 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989).
163 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
16 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452.
165 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (citation omitted).
166 James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2005).
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philosophies is an inevitable side-effect of judging; there will always be
cases in which "the law runs out" and in which judges must therefore
make law.167 If not decided on statutory interpretation grounds, questions
about the dignitary effects of laws may well be decided on constitutional
grounds instead, and similar objections about unmoored decision-making
would likewise abound. The real question is not whether using dignity
would empower judges. Almost any statutory review does. The question
is whether dignity is at least as capable of principled canonization as
other substantive values that have already received this treatment.1 68
As discussed above, there is a strong case to be made that it is. More
importantly, the limitations discussed in Part I.A-especially the need to
hew close to existing constitutional dignity doctrine-would rein judges
in. In the United States and around the world, "courts interpreting the
concept of dignity and applying it to concrete factual situations have de-
veloped a sense of the word that is coherent and substantive, and not
merely a product of each judge's idiosyncratic moral standards." 169 As
we saw in Part I, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution pro-
tects three forms of dignity: equality, adequacy, and autonomy. Only vio-
lations of these principles, as informed by existing constitutional
jurisprudence, could trigger the dignity canon in statutory cases. Judges
could not simply gallivant into areas into which the Constitution does not
extend. Particularly at the lower court level, where Supreme Court prece-
dent is binding, judges would be more than capable of using the dignity
canon in a principled manner.
b. The "Too Much Constitutional Law" Argument
Second, some have argued that importing constitutional values into
statutory interpretation allows judges "to make constitutional law on the
cheap."o70 Resolution through substantive canons, critics argue, allows
judges to treat decisions of enormous importance as "mere" statutory in-
167 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino's Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a Jurisprudence
of Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 St. Louis U. L.J. 865, 874 (2013); see H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAw 272 (1994). Legal positivists dispute this view, Eskridge, supra, at 874,
as does Dworkinian theory, HART, supra, at 272-73, as both believe that the grounds of law
are ultimately objective. As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to argue that conflicting
moral philosophies are not involved in judicial decision-making when existing law cannot
answer a question.
168 See Hasen, supra note 153, at 96.
169 DALY, supra note 156, at 5.
170 John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REv.
399, 449 (2010). There are legitimate reasons, rooted both in legal theory, id. at 449-50, and
the empirical reality of how legislatures draft, Gluck & Bressman, supra note 154, at 940, to
consider folding the constitutionally derived substantive canons into the general canon of con-
stitutional avoidance and requiring a potential violation of a specific constitutional doctrine
before reading a statute a different way. But we are not yet living, and may never live, in such
a world.
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terpretation cases. The result is a counter-majoritarian system in which
courts can drastically change the law without the same salience that
would accompany constitutional decisions. 17 1 Substantive canons also let
courts combine numerous specific constitutional texts into free-floating
constitutional "values," which judges can then impose on legislatures in
a way that they might not be able to do through constitutional analysis. 172
To a textualist, such attempts to "flatten out the complexity of constitu-
tional law" would appear illegitimate.1 7 3
These arguments, however, have to be weighed against the potential
damage to both the judiciary's reputation and the legislative process of
instead nullifying entire statutes. The same salience that makes constitu-
tional decisions seem at least marginally more majoritarian also makes
them more controversial. The courts' legitimacy--really the only
weapon in their arsenal when it comes to compelling public compliance
with their rulings--can be severely lessened when they invoke the Con-
stitution to strike down laws.' 7 4 Moreover, as discussed above, employ-
ing a dignity canon would still leave legislatures room to override court
decisions if legislators feel strongly enough about the issue.1 7 5 Only the
courts or a constitutional amendment, on the other hand, can overrule
constitutional decisions.
A dignity canon may thus "provide a gentler alternative to Marbury-
style judicial review."1 7 6 It would allow courts to police the panoply of
constitutional rights that are based in dignitary concerns without striking
down entire statutes. This rationale is common to all of the constitution-
ally derived substantive canons.177 While statutory cases do not have the
same salience as constitutional ones, the price for such heightened sali-
ence is unreviewable constitutional invalidation of duly passed statutes.
A dignity canon, on the other hand, could avoid this problem while still
calling attention to dignitary harms. It "may even be democracy-enhanc-
ing by focusing the political process on the values enshrined in the
Constitution."1 7 8
171 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 636; Note, Chevron and the Substantive Ca-
nons: A Categorical Distinction, 124 HARV. L. REv. 594, 598 (2010).
172 Manning, supra note 170, at 449.
173 Id. at 450.
174 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-67
(1992); Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 27
(1975).
175 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 637.
176 Manning, supra note 170, at 450.
177 See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV.
109, 176 (2010); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Making Laws Moral: A Defense of Substantive Ca-
nons of Construction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 915, 962 (2001).
178 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 631 (emphasis added).
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c. The "Really, Another Canon?" Argument
Finally, one might ask, simply: do we really need yet another ca-
non? After all, there are already over one hundred substantive canons in
existence.' 7 9 And some of these canons already seem to encroach on
what would be the dignity canon's domain--in particular, the constitu-
tional avoidance canon, 8 0 the canons protecting suspect classes,'s' and
the canon that "remedial statutes should be liberally construed."1 82 Is the
creation of a new dignity canon really worth the hassle?
The answer, I would argue, is yes. The dignity canon would fill a
space that is currently left unoccupied in statutory jurisprudence, protect-
ing values that normally are only considered in constitutional cases. As
discussed more in the next Section, 183 the dignity canon would go further
than the canon of constitutional avoidance. It would also provide greater
expressive value and preference-eliciting effects: the rule would be
geared toward a specific subject--dignity-as opposed to being a broad
constitutional avoidance canon, and it would further a diffuse constitu-
tional value that the avoidance rule's focus on specific rights causes it to
overlook. Unlike the suspect-class canons, a dignity canon would focus
on harms to the dignity of any group. And, while the remedial statutes
canon only allows for the expansion of laws providing positive rights, a
dignity canon would also restrict the reach of laws that deny rights.
As for the sheer number of canons, this proliferation is due at least
in part to the many canons that govern individual issue areas.1 84 It would
be passing strange 8 5 to deny dignity a place among the ranks because
too many other topics are already represented there. Moreover, while the
total number of canons is quite large, the number applicable in a given
case is much smaller. The value of the dignity canon is much greater than
the small additional muddle it might create in any particular case. On the
other side of the ledger, meanwhile, creating a dignity canon would en-
gender almost no transaction costs. Indeed, all a court would have to do
is announce it. This is because the canons fall somewhere between mere
rules of thumb and judicial common law.1 86 A court must obviously pro-
vide sufficient justification for developing a canon, but legal legitimacy
is the only necessary criterion for canon formation.
179 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
180 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005).
181 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 602-03.
182 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968).
183 See infra notes 242-244 and accompanying text.
184 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 108, at 1111-14 (listing canons).
185 See WlLLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 1, sc. 3.
186 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law"
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1912 (2011).
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The major questions doctrine provides a prominent example of this.
Sometimes conflated with the related "elephants in mouseholes" canon,
the major questions doctrine did not really exist until the mid-1990s.1 87
Then, in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co. 8 8 and FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,189 the Court suddenly thrust it
upon the country. In MCI, the Court had to determine whether a statute
authorized the Federal Communications Commission to exempt certain
telephone companies from having to file tariff rates.1 90 The Court deter-
mined, based solely on its own intuition, that "[i]t is highly unlikely that
Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry will be
entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion."191
Six years later, in Brown & Williamson, the Court held that the FDA did
not have the power to regulate tobacco, in part because it thought "Con-
gress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion."1 92 To
support this new major questions canon, the Court cited only two
sources: MCI, and a law review article by Justice Breyer.1 93 The Court
simply used its understanding of separation of powers to fashion a new
rule of statutory interpretation.194 The dignity canon, grounded even
more firmly in constitutional principles than the major questions rule is,
can be created just as easily.
B. Dignity as a Clear Statement Rule
Having (hopefully) convinced you that human dignity is worthy of
canonization, we must still ask: what form would this canon take? This
Section will argue that the dignity canon should act as a clear statement
rule, a requirement that a legislature speak clearly if it wishes to infringe
on individuals' dignity.
There are three different ways in which canons are structured. First,
some canons operate as tiebreakers: if a statute remains ambiguous after
the application of other canons, the courts will read the law in a particu-
lar way. The rule of lenity is one example of a tiebreaker canon;19 5 Chev-
187 See Steve R. Johnson, Elephants, Mouse Holes, Non-Barking Dogs, and Statutory
Interpretations 911, TAx ANALYSTS: INTERPRETATION MATTERS (June 25, 2012), http://taxprof
.typepad.corn/files/64st0911 .pdf.
188 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
189 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
190 MCI, 512 U.S. at 220.
191 Id. at 231.
192 529 U.S. at 160.
193 Id. at 159-60.
194 Id. at 159.
195 See Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 968 (2016).
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ron deference to agency interpretations of their operating statutes is
another.1 9 6
Second, many canons act as "presumptions," assuming that the leg-
islature intended to do something unless evidence from the text, legisla-
tive history, or the overall statutory scheme suggest otherwise. 197
Examples of presumptions include the whole act rule, which "assumes
that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning";1 98 ejusdem generis, which "limits general
terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those speci-
fied";1 99 and the presumption against extraterritoriality, which assumes
that statutes do not apply abroad.200 These canons can all be defeated by
contextual or other clues.
And third, some canons are clear statement rules, which "requir[e]
statutory text to be unambiguous if it is to overcome canonical presump-
tions in particular areas of policy." 2 0 1 In Pennhurst State School & Hos-
pital v. Halderman, for instance, the Court said that "if Congress intends
to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so
unambiguously." 20 2 Legislative history or general purpose is not enough
to overcome a clear statement rule; the text itself must be explicit. Clear
statement rules are "government-structuring canons" 203-canons meant
to enforce the values instilled by our constitutional system. It is in this
category that the dignity canon belongs. The rest of this Section will
explain why.
1. Dignity is Under-Enforced in Constitutional Law
There are a number of reasons to formulate the dignity canon as a
clear statement rule. The first and most important is that dignity is inade-
quately enforced as a legal value. Legislatures are unlikely to consider
the full consequences of individual bills for the dignity of those affected.
Public choice theory shows why this is so. Legislators prefer to avoid
what they consider to be unnecessary risks, and they organize their agen-
196 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
197 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 597.
198 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
199 United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975) (quoting Gooch v. United States, 297
U.S. 124, 128 (1936)).
200 Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
201 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 53 (2014). Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
115, at 595 n.4, add a category of "super-strong clear statement rules," which "require very
specifically targeted 'clear statements' on the face of the statute to rebut a policy presump-
tion." I do not differentiate between normal versus "super-strong" clear statement rules.
202 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
203 KATZMANN, supra note 201, at 51.
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das and their vote patterns accordingly. 204 At its most cynical, public
choice theory envisions legislation as a form of rent-seeking, in which
interest groups use their political and economic clout to redistribute
wealth and power their way. 205 One need not hold such a dark view of
our political system, however, to agree that certain groups have more
influence than others, and that this can lead to unequal fights in the legis-
lative process. Sometimes, public-regarding motives manage to defeat
self-interested ones; but oftentimes interest groups can twist the process
to their own purposes, or at least crowd out other, disadvantaged
groups.2 0 6
The desire to protect dignity is one of the public-regarding motives
that other interests often drown out. After all, the dignity-based harms
that statutes create often fall on relatively powerless individuals: minori-
ties, criminals, and the poor, among others.2 0 7 In such cases, "where a
statute establishes 'asymmetrical' obligations and benefits (i.e., the bene-
ficiaries of the law have either more or less political clout than the cost
payers), there is a danger of legislative or administrative dysfunction." 2 0 8
This danger is compounded by dignity's unusual status. Dignity is a con-
stitutional value rather than a constitutional right. It is not directly tied
down to a particular constitutional provision or amendment, and some-
times is not directly enforceable by any specific provision. 2 0 9 It is rela-
tively easy to tell that a law might attempt to authorize searches without
probable cause, or that it might infringe on free speech rights. Costs to
human dignity, however, do not float so close to the surface. This makes
it even less likely that legislators will consider the effects of their laws on
dignity unprompted; they may not even be aware that there is a constitu-
tional norm to be protected in the first place.
Nor have the courts fully corrected this imbalance. Although it has
made its way into many areas of constitutional law, there is no enforcea-
ble constitutional right to dignity.210 And, even on the issues in which
204 Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-
System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 310 n.211 (1997).
205 Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Inter-
pretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 230 (1986).
206 Id. at 228.
207 Cf Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and
Dignity Claims, 69 FLA. L. REv. 1, 3 & n.5 (2017) (noting that scholars have argued that
"dignity-based claims can ... produce good outcomes for plaintiffs who suffer from racial
inequality" and have discussed a "dignity-based approach to individuals' post-incarceration
lives") (quoting Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Con-
fronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 457, 526 (2010)).
208 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 279 (1988).
209 See supra Part I.A.
210 Cf Hasen, supra note 153, at 98 (arguing in favor of the democracy canon in part
because "one cannot constitutionally enforce a 'right to vote"').
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dignity plays a role, the Court has been less than full-throated in its de-
fense of individual rights. The Fourth Amendment protects against intru-
sive searches on dignity and privacy grounds; 211 yet the exceptions to the
warrant requirement have threatened to swallow the general rule.2 12 The
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause no longer prohibits the death
penalty; 213 a recent call to reexamine the constitutionality of the death
penalty received only two votes and was derided as an abolitionist
"Groundhog Day." 214 The Court has limited abortion rights, 215 refused to
recognize the right to die,216 and come up short in providing equal pro-
tection of voting rights. 217 This is not to belittle the wide array of dig-
nity-based case law discussed in Part I. It is merely to suggest that the
Court has not enforced the constitutional dignity value to its fullest
extent.
Clear statement rules provide a powerful alternative way to enforce
otherwise under-enforced constitutional norms.218 Dignity, like other
constitutional values-such as federalism, separation of powers, and
even due process-suffuses itself throughout many constitutional provi-
sions. Because they often appear sub rosa, constitutional values do not
create the same sorts of direct restrictions on legislative activity that the
more concrete rights do.219 However, leaving these protections to the
political process alone is dangerous, because there is no incentive to en-
act laws that benefit the diffuse and politically powerless groups these
constitutional values are designed to defend.220
The Court has said, therefore, that judges must provide extra protec-
tion at the level of statutory interpretation: a court "must be absolutely
certain that [the legislature] intended" to impinge on constitutional val-
ues before reading a statute to do S0.221 For this reason, under-enforced
constitutional norms are usually formulated as clear statement rules. 2 2 2
211 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
212 See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 569 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting); California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Wayne A. Logan, An Exception
Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
381, 383 (2001).
213 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S 153, 187, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion) (joint opinion of
Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.); id. (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
214 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring); see id. at 2755
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
215 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156 (2007). But see Whole Woman's
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016).
216 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
217 See Hasen, supra note 153, at 99.
218 Barrett, supra note 177, at 171-72; Hasen, supra note 153, at 96.
219 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 597.
220 Macey, supra note 205, at 231.
221 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991).
222 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 597.
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The federalism canon, 223 the presumption against preemption, 2 2 4 the ma-
jor questions rule preventing delegation of important issues to agen-
cies, 2 2 5 the presumption against abrogation of sovereign immunity, 2 2 6 the
presumption against retroactivity, 227 the presumption of consistency with
international law, 228 and the presumption against abrogation of treaties 229
are just some of the many constitutionally derived clear statement rules.
Dignity, as another under-enforced constitutional value, should receive
similarly strong protection in statutory cases.
2. A Clear Statement Rule Would Have Preference-Eliciting
Effects
The second reason to consider a dignity clear statement rule is that it
would have positive feedback effects. We have already explored this in
Part II.A, but it is as relevant to the form the dignity canon should take as
it is to the question of the canon's existence. Indeed, it is one of the
Court's central justifications for clear statement rules. As the Court has
put it: "Implied limitation rules avoid applications of otherwise unambig-
uous statutes that would intrude on sensitive domains in a way that [the
legislature] is unlikely to have intended had it considered the matter." 2 30
This statement hearkens back to the two-pronged vision of statutory in-
terpretation outlined in the previous Section. A dignity clear statement
rule would respect the idealized view of legislative drafting, which as-
sumes that the legislature would not want to violate constitutional values.
Yet it would still allow legislatures to go back and revisit statutes, in-
stead of taking issues completely out of the legislative arena through ju-
dicial review.
A dignity clear statement rule would also be "preference-elicit-
ing," 23 1 in that it could force legislatures to deliberate and choose statu-
tory text with greater precision to avoid accidentally infringing on
individual dignity.232 "[T]he requirement of clear statement assures that
the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the
223 See Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1998) (citation
omitted) (overall constitutional structure).
224 See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (internal citation
marks omitted) (overall constitutional structure).
225 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (separa-
tion of powers).
226 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (Eleventh
Amendment).
227 See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265-68 (1994) (due process).
228 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(Supremacy Clause).
229 See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (Supremacy Clause).
230 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (plurality opinion).
231 See Hasen, supra note 153, at 100.
232 See Eskridge & Fickey, supra note 115, at 598.
2017] 447
448 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 27:415
critical matters involved in the judicial decision." 233 A dignity clear
statement rule would help ensure that legislatures pay close attention to
potential dignitary harms and consciously decide that other factors out-
weigh dignity-based concerns. It helps that the statutes that would be
most affected by a dignity canon deal with controversial issues like abor-
tion, discrimination, and criminal justice; such laws would capture
greater than average attention from legislators and would lead to highly
salient court decisions.234 The dignity canon is thus particularly likely to
have a preference-eliciting effect on legislatures. If one believes that
greater respect for dignity is a good thing, then forcing legislatures to pay
more attention to the effects of their laws on dignity would be a positive
development. Formulating the dignity canon as a clear statement rule
would allow courts to "open[ ] a dialogue with [the legislative branch],
but one in which the factor of inertia is now on the side of individual
liberty." 235
3. A Dignity Clear Statement Rule Would Better Protect
Individual Liberties
Finally, a dignity clear statement rule would be valuable because of
the substantive nature of dignity itself. Dignity is, at bottom, a value
based in individual liberty. By ensuring a degree of equality, autonomy,
and adequacy of treatment, dignity acts directly to protect human free-
dom. Most clear statement rules, however, are not of this nature--even
though most theorists mention individual rights-protecting norms as
those most likely to be under-enforced. 236 Indeed, the Court has tamped
down its protection of individual rights in statutory interpretation over
the past few decades. 237 Instead, the Court has moved toward creating
clear statement rules that are designed to protect structural norms. 2 3 8 The
federalism canon from Gregory and the major questions rule from Brown
& Williamson are two prominent examples of these structural clear state-
ment rules. 239 As the Court has pointed out, these structural protections
are ultimately meant to check government power in order to ensure more
individual liberty.240 However, they do this through a rather indirect
route, and often end up merely shifting the balance of power from federal
233 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
234 Cf Hasen, supra note 153, at 102-03 (arguing that the Democracy Canon meets these
same criteria and therefore would likely be preference-eliciting).
235 Monaghan, supra note 174, at 29 (footnote omitted).
236 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 632.
237 See id. at 597.
238 Id. at 632.
239 501 U.S. 452 (1991); 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
240 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991).
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to state government rather than from either government to the people. 2 4 1
A dignity clear statement rule, on the other hand, would directly protect
individual freedom.
A clear statement rule also would provide utility above that of the
general constitutional avoidance canon. The constitutional avoidance ca-
non holds that, "when deciding which of two plausible statutory con-
structions to adopt, . . . [i]f one of them would raise a multitude of
constitutional problems, the other should prevail." 2 4 2 As dignity is a con-
stitutional protection, 24 3 this canon would apply to at least some cases in
which statutes impose harms to dignity. But constitutional avoidance is
not a clear statement rule; "[i]t is a tool for choosing between competing
plausible interpretations of a statutory text." 244 It therefore can only oper-
ate if the language at issue has at least two plausible constructions. A
dignity clear statement rule, however, would be more aggressive: unless
there is clear language to rebut the presumption, courts must read the
statute at issue so as to maintain human dignity. There is thus a zone of
cases in which a dignity clear statement rule would provide more protec-
tion than would constitutional avoidance alone.
4. The Counterargument: Clear Statement Rules Are
Undemocratic
Of course, there are also downsides to formulating the dignity canon
as a clear statement rule. Perhaps the strongest argument against the idea
looks something like this: clear statement rules reflect a hardheaded tex-
tualist viewpoint that canons of interpretation are meant to force legisla-
tures to follow certain rules of drafting. 2 4 5 By reading a statute to avoid
harms to dignity when the language is less than clear, judges risk the
very real danger of reading that statute differently from-or even in op-
position to-how the legislature intended the law to operate. Clear state-
ment rules are out of sync with purposive interpretation, critics claim,
because they do not look beyond the text of a law to determine whether a
particular reading would better comport with the enacting body's under-
standing of that law. 2 4 6 Even under textualist theory, clear statement
rules are problematic because they move courts away from examining
241 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204, 211
(2009); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 473.
242 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005).
243 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014).
244 Clark, 543 U.S. at 381.
245 See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) ("What is of paramount
importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive
rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts."), superseded by statute, Judi-
cial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, tit. I, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5089, as recog-
nized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
246 See KATzMANN, supra note 201, at 31.
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what the text does say and toward judge-based policy presumptions
about what the text should say. Clear statement rules thus transform the
judiciary from the legislature's partner or agent into its master.
There are both textualist and purposivist responses to this counter-
argument. From a textualist standpoint, what clear statement rules lose in
terms of nuanced textual interpretation, they make up for with a clearer
communication to legislatures of what is expected of them. Such rules
can thereby create a feedback loop with the legislatures: by allowing
them "to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules," clear
statement requirements ensure that lawmakers "know the effect of the
language [each statute] adopts." 247 In this way, clear statement rules
would eventually shape how legislatures write statutory text, while also
enforcing important constitutional values.
Clear statement rules are also arguably more respectful of legisla-
tive supremacy than are mere presumptions, because they tell legislatures
not only what the rule is but also how it will be applied (i.e., alone,
before other canons, rather than as one among many presumptions). 248
As of now, most congressional drafters are unaware of the existence of
clear statement rules, making it rather difficult to legislate in their
shadow.24 9 But, if the courts could open greater channels of communica-
tion with legislative drafters, this problem would be surmountable.
As for purposivism, the argument against clear statement rules is
stronger for those not derived from constitutional values. But a dignity
clear statement rule would be used to infuse constitutional principles into
statutory interpretation. As higher law, the Constitution's commands can
override the legislature's intent. This idea has formed the basis for con-
stitutional analysis of statutes since Marbury v. Madison.250 The power
of the greater--in this case, to strike down an entire statute as unconsti-
tutional-may fairly be said to include the lesser--to avoid sanctioning a
burden on constitutional values by reading a less-than-unambiguous stat-
ute as conforming to those values. Far better to read a statute in this way,
and then allow the legislature to override the decision if it feels strongly
enough, than to decide a constitutional issue unnecessarily.
Another way to think about this is that purposivism requires judges
to look beyond the subjective purpose the legislature gave a particular
law. They "also should integrate [the law] into the legislative system as a
whole by giving expression to the fundamental values of the system." 25 1
247 Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
248 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 282-83 (1994).
249 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 114, at 945.
250 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
251 AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAw 340 (trans. Sari Bashi, 2005).
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This gibes with Dworkinian theory, as well. 2 5 2 Judges should pay atten-
tion to constitutional values regardless of whether the legislature did in a
particular case, but it is also fair to think that legislators prefer constitu-
tionally sound to constitutionally unsound laws. Like the constitutional
avoidance canon, then, a dignity clear statement rule reflects "the reason-
able presumption that Congress did not intend [to draft a statute] which
raises serious constitutional doubts." 253 By keeping the legislature's stat-
ute intact, such a rule also helps avoid unnecessary friction between the
branches. 2 54
Of course, to circumvent the dignity canon, legislatures would have
to draft statutes that unambiguously abrogate human dignity. This could
then invite constitutional challenges to those statutes. But, in cases where
these laws are struck down, the clear statement rule's only purpose
would be to show that Congress cannot try to mandate vaguely what it
cannot mandate directly. And, because clear statement rules tend to
sweep further than would pure constitutional analysis, a law that could be
subject to the dignity canon when ambiguous may not actually be subject
to constitutional scrutiny if later rid of ambiguity. This is true of other
clear statement rules, as well. For instance, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the
Court determined, as a matter of federalism in statutory interpretation,
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to state
judges. 255 Yet, in EEOC v. Wyoming, the Court had ruled it constitu-
tional to extend the ADEA to state government employers. 2 56 Therefore,
if Congress had responded to Gregory by applying the ADEA to state
judges, there would not have been any more of a constitutional federal-
ism problem than there would have been with the rest of the law. 2 5 7
There is one other, perhaps more cynical response to the argument
against a dignity clear statement rule. The horse is out of the barn: clear
statement rules are here to stay. Several other constitutional values have
been transformed into clear statement rules. As we have seen, however,
these canons tend to protect structural rather than individual rights.2 58 It
might do more good than harm to add a clear statement rule that protects
fundamental individual rights.
Putting together the foregoing Sections, we can formulate the dig-
nity canon and its standards in the following way:
252 See supra Part II.A.1.
253 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
254 BREYER, supra note 34, at 104-05.
255 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
256 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
257 Indeed, the Court intimated as much in Gregory. 501 U.S. at 470.
258 ESKRIDGE, supra note 248, at 287-89.
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A court will not read a statute to affect the rights of the
people or of a particular group in a way that exhibits
disrespect for their intrinsic worth as human beings, un-
less the statute contains clear language to that effect. By
"exhibits disrespect for their intrinsic worth," we mean
statutory language that: (1) saddles certain groups with
special burdens or provides them with lesser protections,
or else provides unreasonably differential treatment to
individuals; (2) fails to meet, in regard to any person, the
minimum adequate level of treatment required by civi-
lized society; or (3) unduly encroaches on areas of per-
sonal autonomy. These standards are to be determined in
accordance with existing law.
With this canon now assembled, we can see how it would apply in con-
crete situations. The next Part takes up that task.
IHl. TIE DIGNITY CANON IN PRACTICE
We have now seen how the dignity canon would work in theory: it
would require a clear statement from the legislature before reading a stat-
ute to lessen individuals' intrinsic worth. This Part will examine how the
dignity canon would apply in the three areas of law discussed in Part I-
civil rights, criminal procedure, and personal health. While these are not
the only areas in which the dignity canon would operate, they are per-
haps the most prominent and provide ready examples. By conducting a
"re-do" of three important cases, this Part will show that the dignity ca-
non would lead to results different from those to which the majority
came.
A. Civil Rights: Romer v. Evans
Discrimination cases illustrate that the protection of human dignity
requires a basic equality of treatment. The Court has enforced this
through a concept of "equal dignity." 259 To deny people of a certain class
a benefit available freely to others, or to impose a penalty on a class not
imposed on others, is to express the government's refusal to recognize
the intrinsic worth of those affected. The dignity canon thus includes an
element of equality in it: a statute could become subject to the dignity
canon if it disrespects the dignity of a specific group.
The use of such a canon could have greatly changed the Court's
decision in Romer v. Evans.260 In that case, the Court confronted a Colo-
rado constitutional amendment, passed by referendum, that stated:
259 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
260 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its
branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, politi-
cal subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance
or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual ori-
entation, conduct, practices or relationships shall consti-
tute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or
class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimi-
nation.26 1
The amendment was designed to preempt several municipal ordinances
that had banned discrimination based on sexual orientation.2 62
There are three ways to read this amendment. First, it could be read
to prohibit only the enactment of special privileges for gay people that
are not granted to the rest of the population. Second, it could be read to
forbid gay people from taking advantage of more general anti-discrimi-
nation statutes that protect other traditionally marginalized groups. Or
third, it could prohibit gay people from taking advantage of generally
applicable laws-say, the ability to claim self-defense in a criminal case,
or the right to register to vote. This third reading would almost certainly
be unconstitutional under even rational basis review, as there is no ra-
tional reason to differentiate between homosexuals and others for these
purposes. The battle, therefore, lay mainly between the first and second
readings of the amendment.
The Colorado Supreme Court had given an interpretation of the law,
which under federal precedent was entitled to deference; the Justices,
however, disagreed as to what the Colorado court had actually said. Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent in Romer saw the decision below as adopting the
"special privileges" reading.263 Justice Scalia, therefore, subjected the
amendment only to rational basis review, and found the desire not to
favor homosexual conduct to be legitimate under Bowers v. Hardwick.264
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, however, read the Colorado Su-
preme Court as having adopted the second, anti-antidiscrimination read-
ing of the amendment. 2 6 5 The Court found that the amendment, so read,
"declar[ed] that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government," and thereby
261 Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
262 Id. at 623-24.
263 Id. at 637-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264 Id. at 640-43.
265 Id. at 626-27 (majority opinion). The Court hinted that the amendment might even
enact the third reading, but did not decide this because the Colorado Supreme Court had not
done so. Id. at 630.
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constituted "a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal
sense." 266 This, combined with evidence that the amendment was moti-
vated by animus toward gay people, meant that the law could not pass
rational basis review. 267
The dignity canon could have changed the outcome in Romer.
Given that the Court could not agree on how the Colorado Supreme
Court interpreted the amendment, 268 it could have looked to the text of
the amendment itself. On the face of it, the amendment does not provide
a ready answer as to whether it has a narrow or a broad scope. The
phrase "claim of discrimination," in particular, seems ambiguous. The
other phrases are also unclear, and lean in opposing directions: the phrase
"quota preferences" is suggestive of a special privileges view of the
amendment, while "minority status" and "protected status" lean toward
an interpretation that excludes sexual orientation from general antidis-
crimination laws. Since the amendment does not contain a clear state-
ment that it denies homosexuals the protections of general anti-
discrimination laws, the dignity canon would kick in. The Court would
read the statute in the way least likely to show disrespect for the equal
dignity of homosexuals as compared to other groups. This would mean
reading the amendment to only prohibit special privileges for homosexu-
als (for instance, affirmative action or quotas) not given to other groups.
Rather than being struck down, as it was in Romer, the amendment
would likely be upheld as constitutional under this reading.269
B. Criminal Procedure: Muscarello v. United States
While discrimination cases reflect the equality aspect of human dig-
nity, criminal procedure cases show that dignity requires a minimum ad-
equacy of treatment. A dignity clear statement rule would prove a strong
force for adequacy in the criminal justice system. One obvious issue to
which it would apply is the death penalty, which is "uniquely degrading
266 Id. at 633.
267 Id. at 634-35.
268 Normally, "state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law," and federal courts
"are bound by their constructions except in extreme circumstances." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 691 (1975). However, this is not always the case; there is some precedent to suggest
that federal courts can reject state court interpretations of state law if they "impermissibly
distort[ ] them beyond what a fair reading require[s]." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 114-15 & n.1 (discussing cases). Regardless, given that
both the majority and dissent in Romer aired their own views about which reading the amend-
ment's language more naturally fit, see 517 U.S. at 626, 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and given
that they disagreed on which reading the Colorado court gave to the law, see supra notes
263-265 and accompanying text, it would not be out of place to apply the dignity canon and
find that a "fair reading" of the law requires a narrow scope.
269 See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638
(2014) (plurality opinion) (upholding a state constitutional amendment banning the use of "ra-
cial preferences" in public education, employment, and contracting).
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to human dignity." 270 A dignity canon would be of particular use in read-
ing statutes that define capital crimes. Such statutes would be read nar-
rowly, to allow as few actions to be subject to the death penalty as
possible. But the dignity canon would also apply to criminal statutes
across the board, essentially acting as a stronger version of the rule of
lenity. To see how this would work, we will reexamine the case of Mus-
carello v. United States.271
In Muscarello, three defendants were prosecuted under a federal law
that "imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who 'uses
or carries a firearm' 'during and in relation to' a 'drug trafficking
crime.' " 2 7 2 The catch? None of the defendants actually had the guns on
their persons during the trafficking crimes for which they were con-
victed. Instead, all three kept their guns in the glove compartments or
trunks of their cars.2 7 3 The defendants argued that the word "carries" in
the statute did not clearly apply to keeping a gun in a car, and that there-
fore the rule of lenity required the court to read the statute in their
favor.2 7 4
During the Burger Court years, the rule of lenity was treated as a
presumption, or even something close to a clear statement rule. 2 7 5 How-
ever, the rule seesawed somewhat in its form, and, by the 1980s, the
Court both used lenity less often2 76 and started to frame it as a mere
tiebreaker. 277 In Muscarello, the Court confirmed the stingier version of
lenity. Instead of being a presumption, lenity applies "only if, after seiz-
ing everything from which aid can be derived, . . . we can make no more
than a guess as to what Congress intended"-in other words, only if
"there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute." 2 7 8 As the
Muscarello Court framed it, "this Court has never held that the rule of
270 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
271 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
272 Id. at 126 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1924(c)(1)).
273 Id. at 127.
274 Id. at 138.
275 See Eskridge, & Frickey, supra note 115, at 600.
276 Id. at 612.
277 See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997); Staples v. United States,
511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994). The change was partially due to selective readings of earlier
cases. Compare, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974) ("Although penal
laws are to be construed strictly, they 'ought not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the
obvious intention of the legislature.' . . . .'We perceive no grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in
the language and structure of the Act." (citations omitted)), with Chapman v. United States,
500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) ("The rule of lenity, however, is not applicable unless there is a
'grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act'. (quoting Huddle-
ston, 415 U.S. at 831)).
278 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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lenity automatically permits a defendant to win." 2 7 9 The majority upheld
the defendants' convictions. 280
The dignity canon, by contrast, would require a clear textual state-
ment before deciding that a statute authorizes criminal punishment-
punishment that deprives individuals of their liberty and places upon
them the lifetime mark of a conviction record. It would therefore prove at
least as strong as the version of lenity used during the Burger Court
years. Employing the dignity canon, the Court would have sided with the
Muscarello dissent, which read the word "carries" to mean "not merely
keeping arms on one's premises or in one's vehicle, but bearing them in
such manner as to be ready for use as a weapon." 281
To avoid such a reading, a legislature would have had to add ex-
plicit language to the statute that would cover the circumstance of keep-
ing a gun in a vehicle during a drug trafficking crime. Such a statute
might create a five-year prison sentence for anyone who, "during and in
relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking .. . uses, carries, or
transports a firearm." The addition of the word "transports" would be
sufficiently clear to cover the defendants' activity. Otherwise, however,
the dignity canon would read the statute not to apply when criminals
keep guns in their cars but not on their physical person.
At first blush, the idea of using a clear statement rule in criminal
cases may seem frightening. If employed indiscriminately, one might
think, a dignity clear statement rule could essentially eliminate any crime
or punishment that is not clearly expressed. But this concern is unwar-
ranted. Prior to the 1980s, the Court treated the rule of lenity as a clear
statement rule. It required legislatures to "plainly and unmistakably" 282
make particular conduct a crime, using "language that is clear and defi-
nite." 2 8 3 Thus, a dignity clear statement rule would operate the same way
the rule of lenity did for decades. Rather than a new, uncontrollable mon-
ster, the dignity canon would be a familiar, manageable beast.
Moreover, even clear statement rules are rebuttable. The Court's
description of the old rule of lenity would apply alike to the dignity ca-
non: "Although penal laws are to be construed strictly, they 'ought not to
be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legisla-
ture.' "284 If the text and structure of a law clearly show that the legisla-
ture criminalized the sort of conduct in question, this would overcome
279 Id. at 139.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 140 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
282 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
283 United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222 (1952). Other
scholars have called for a return to this sort of standard. See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, Overcom-
ing Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 580, 581-82 (2012).
284 Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974).
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the canon. This standard is more forgiving than that of what Bill Es-
kridge and Philip Frickey have termed "super-strong clear statement
rules," which "can be rebutted only through unambiguous statutory text
targeted at the specific problem." 285 Particularly in the realm of criminal
law, where statutes must use broader language to encompass the untold
potential varieties of criminal conduct, the dignity clear statement rule
would not require this degree of targeting. "[W]hen words have a clear
definition, . . . canons cannot properly defeat [a legislature's] decision to
draft broad legislation." 2 8 6 The dignity clear statement rule would thread
the required needle, providing greater protection than today's rule of len-
ity without placing every criminal statute in danger.
C. Personal Health: Harris v. McRae
In addition to ensuring minimum adequacy and equality of treat-
ment, the dignity canon would help create and defend substantive rights
that are tied to personal autonomy. Health rights provide one example of
this latter function. Statutes that are asserted to deny access to life-saving
(or, in some cases, suicide-assisting) drugs would be read narrowly ab-
sent clear statements to the contrary. 287 Conversely, laws providing posi-
tive rights to health care, such as the Medicare Act or the Affordable
Care Act, would be read broadly to allow for greater coverage. 2 8 8 The
dignity canon would also limit otherwise ambiguous statutory barriers
for women seeking abortions. A re-do of Harris v. McRae2 89 illustrates
how the dignity canon would operate in this sphere.
In Harris, the Court considered a challenge to the Hyde Amend-
ment, which prohibits federal funding for abortion services. 290 As part of
the challenge, the Court had to determine whether the Medicaid Act re-
quires states participating in Medicaid to provide abortion services de-
spite the lack of federal funding.29 1 The Act says that "State plan[s] for
medical assistance must" make certain forms of medical assis-
tance-including inpatient and outpatient hospital services, family plan-
ning services, and physician's services-available to those who meet
statutory criteria of need. 2 9 2 The plaintiffs argued that the Hyde Amend-
285 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 115, at 611-12.
286 Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1097 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
287 Cf Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006) (holding that the Attorney General
lacks power under the Controlled Substances Act to "bar dispensing controlled substances for
assisted suicide in the face of a state medical regime permitting such conduct").
288 Cf King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (holding that federal subsidies are
available for individuals on federal health exchanges under the ACA).
289 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
290 See id.
291 Id. at 301.
292 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (2015) (emphasis added); Harris, 448
U.S. at 301-02.
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ment withdrew federal funding for, but not the states' obligation to pro-
vide, medically necessary abortion services. 293
The Court, employing mainly structural arguments, read the statute
to relieve states of their obligation to provide services for which the fed-
eral government revoked funding. 294 The Court noted that Medicaid was
a product of cooperative federalism, requiring payments from both the
federal and state governments. 295 Additionally, "[n]othing . . . sug-
gest[ed] that Congress intended to require a participating State to assume
the full costs of providing any health services in its Medicaid plan." 296
The Court thus presumed that states would not have to provide unfunded
services, unless it could discern a legislative intent otherwise. 297 Because
the Hyde Amendment did not contain such an indication, the Court con-
cluded that states did not have to provide abortion services under
Medicaid.298
The dignity canon would flip this presumption on its head. On the
face of the statute, not only are states not exempted from providing fed-
erally unfunded services, they "must" provide medically necessary treat-
ment that falls within the statutory categories. 299 The Hyde Amendment,
meanwhile, removes federal funding for abortion services, but says noth-
ing about whether states must provide abortion services. 30 Thus, neither
law explicitly relieved the states of the obligation to provide a set of
healthcare services that is otherwise required under Medicaid. In this sit-
uation, the dignity clear statement rule would outweigh the general struc-
tural arguments the Court used to read the Medicaid statute the opposite
way.
Nowadays, the Court has another weapon it could use to oppose the
dignity canon: the federalism clear statement rule. As mentioned in the
previous Part, the Court perfected this rule in Gregory v. Ashcroft, re-
quiring a clear textual statement to alter the traditional federal-state bal-
ance. 301 The Medicaid statute requires states to provide medical care that
they otherwise would not; this is exactly the sort of alteration to the fed-
eralist system to which the Gregory rule was meant to apply. Theoreti-
cally, this could lead to the sort of canon clash that often occurs in
293 Harris, 448 U.S. at 307-08.
294 Id. at 310.
295 Id. at 308.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 309 & n.13.
298 Id. at 310-11.
299 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (2015).
300 Harris, 448 U.S. at 302.
301 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
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statutory interpretation cases. 3 0 2 But in this case, the statute provides a
very clear statement that states "must" pay for family planning ser-
vices-perhaps clear enough to satisfy Gregory-with no corresponding
clear statement in the Hyde Amendment to counter the dignity canon. 3 0 3
To be sure, Congress may not have thought that it was issuing an
unfunded mandate to provide abortions. And a ruling reading the statute
as creating such a mandate would have significant political conse-
quences. Such an interpretation, however, would create a powerful incen-
tive for Congress either to refrain from Hyde Amendment-like additions
to Medicaid or to more explicitly exempt any unfunded services from the
statute. The former would directly increase people's positive rights,
while the latter would make more salient Congress's decision to deny
those rights to Medicaid patients.
D. Putting It Together: Lessons from the Case Studies
The previous three Sections outlined concrete examples of how a
dignity clear statement rule would operate in real cases. Analyzing these
case studies as a group, we can also glean two important lessons about
the dignity canon. The first lesson is that, while the dignity canon has
great power to decide individual cases, this power is neither undirected
nor unlimited. Rather, the results in the case studies are tethered to dig-
nity's place in constitutional law. Recall that the dignity canon, like the
constitutional value of dignity, has three components: equality, advo-
cacy, and autonomy. This creates specific limitations on the sorts of stat-
utory language against which the canon can act. It can read statutes to
prevent three forms of indignity: (1) placing special burdens on or giving
lesser protections to a particular group-or, equivalently, using signifi-
cantly different standards for different individuals (equality); (2) treating
people in a manner that does not comport with the minimum standards of
a civilized society (adequacy); or (3) unduly intruding on personal deci-
sion-making in spheres considered to be core to individual liberty (auton-
omy). Courts have no freestanding authority to go beyond these three
forms of indignity, or to read statutes to forbid what the Court has al-
ready explicitly held that the Constitution allows.
In the Muscarello case study, for instance, there is a clear constitu-
tional interest at stake. The blow that criminal convictions inflict on indi-
viduals' dignity requires statutes to provide proper notice before
criminalizing conduct; to put someone in prison for actions that were not
clearly illegal is to deny that person the minimum level of due process
302 See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 964-65 (2016) (determining that
the last antecedent rule trumps the series qualifier canon as the best way to read the statute at
issue); id. at 969-70 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing the opposite).
303 See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
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required by our legal system. 30 Similarly, in Romer, reading the Colo-
rado amendment to exclude gay people from general anti-discrimination
laws would both place a special burden on gay people--unlike other
groups, they would have to pass another constitutional amendment to
give them access to anti-discrimination laws-and give gay people lesser
protection than other groups. The case study of Harris also comports
with these limitations on the dignity canon, though the analysis is slightly
more complicated. Since the 1970s, the Court has treated abortion as
central to women's autonomy;30 5 reading the Medicaid statute to require
provision of medically necessary abortions helps protect the dignity of
economically disadvantaged women. The Court found it constitutional
for Congress to cut off federal abortion funding through the Hyde
Amendment,30 6 so using the dignity canon to require funding of abor-
tions would raise questions about how far beyond the Constitution itself
the canon could reach. In Harris, however, the dignity canon would only
require access to, not federal funding of, abortions.
The case studies show that the dignity canon is limited in another
way. Like other canons, including the other clear statement rules, the
dignity canon cannot strike laws down. This means that legislatures can
ultimately override courts' interpretations; they would simply have to
clarify the statutory language to cover what the dignity canon caused the
courts to assume it did not. This does not necessarily mean that the statu-
tory ambiguities the dignity canon clarifies would be held unconstitu-
tional if clearly expressed. It may well be constitutional for a statute to
punish the transportation of a gun during a drug deal, but the dignity
canon could still read the ambiguous statute in Muscarello not to cover
this crime. There is no constitutional requirement for states to provide
abortion services, 307 but in Harris the dignity canon could still read the
Hyde Amendment not to cut off the requirements of the Medicaid statute.
Even in a case like Romer, in which the statutory language at issue would
be unconstitutional if clearly expressed, 308 the use of the dignity clear
statement rule shows sufficient respect for the legislative branch. In such
cases, the canon's only effect is to tell legislatures that they cannot do
through unclear language what they would not be able to do directly.
Ultimately, it may be better to force legislatures to clarify statutes and
then face the constitutional issue directly, if there is one, than to allow
30 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (discussing the effects of criminal conviction on "the dignity of the
persons charged").
305 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977).
306 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980).
307 Id
308 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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governments to keep enforcing ambiguous laws that may unconstitution-
ally infringe on individual dignity.
The second lesson from these case studies is that the dignity canon
confounds any expectations we might have about its ideological valence.
The concept of dignity, so common in progressive international human
rights discourse,3m could easily be seen as a way to smuggle liberal re-
sults into judicial opinions.3 10 Yet we can see from the case studies that
this is not necessarily so. The Harris result would certainly hearten
progressives, but the other two case studies do not line up with political
liberalism. In Romer, employing the dignity canon would read the Colo-
rado amendment in a more humane manner: it would only prohibit af-
firmative action or other special privileges for gay people, rather than
preventing them from accessing general anti-discrimination laws. 311 It
should not be forgotten that this was exactly the reading that Justice
Scalia's dissent (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas)
supported.3 12 The conservative wing of the Court, nearly two decades
later, affirmed that statutes prohibiting such special treatment are consti-
tutional even as applied to race.313 The Romer majority took the stere-
otypically "liberal" position; the dignity canon, by contrast, would lead
to a relatively "conservative" interpretation of the amendment. Using the
dignity canon in Romer would also have been conservative in a different
sense: in this case, at least, it would have promoted judicial minimal-
ism. 3 14 Rather than striking down the amendment by announcing a broad
new constitutional rule, as the Romer majority did,3 15 a dignity-canon-
based Romer opinion would have upheld the amendment on statutory
grounds.
The result of the Muscarello case study is more complex, but can
also be seen as conservative. At first glance, reversing the Court's deci-
sion in Muscarello seems only like a victory for criminal defendants--a
stereotypically liberal outcome. And, indeed, it is a pro-criminal-defense
ruling. (This is true of any case employing the rule of lenity, and would
be so of any dignity canon case in the criminal realm.) But one could just
as easily think of Muscarello as a gun rights case, and of the dignity-
30 See John R. Wallach, Dignity: The Last Bastion of Liberalism, 4 HuMA'rrms 313, 314
(2013).
310 See, e.g., Nick Brommel, Beyond Freedom and Equality: The Democratic Value of
Dignity, Bos. REV. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/nick-brommel-dig-
nity-obergefell.
311 See supra notes 268-269 and accompanying text.
312 Romer, 517 U.S. at 638 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014)
(plurality opinion).
314 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism 2 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper
No. 08-40, 2008), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1274200.
315 517 U.S. at 635-36.
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canon-based result as a victory for gun rights. The federal statute at issue
created a new crime, with a five-year mandatory minimum, whenever
one "'uses or carries a firearm' 'during and in relation to' a 'drug traf-
ficking crime."' 316 The Court's decision condemned Frank Muscarello to
jail simply because he had transported a handgun, locked in the glove
compartment of his car, while driving to sell marijuana.317 But in District
of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment "guar-
antee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of con-
frontation." 318 Some of the more conservative Justices have shown
concern about criminalizing the mere possession of firearms, even when
the possessors commit other crimes.319 By reading the drug trafficking
statute to prohibit only the carrying of firearms on one's person, the dig-
nity canon would vindicate Muscarello' s Due Process rights and his Sec-
ond Amendment rights. As the case studies show, the dignity canon
provides workable standards based on settled constitutional values, and it
is devoted to protecting individual liberty rather than assuring either lib-
eral or conservative outcomes.
IV. THE LiMITs OF THE DIGNITY CANON
A dignity clear statement rule could have significant effects across a
variety of substantive areas of law. Three major Supreme Court
cases-and likely a good many more-would have come out quite dif-
ferently. However, there are limitations to the canon's effectiveness. In
particular, it is possible for a single case to pit two dignity interests
against one another, a situation exacerbated by the occasional contests
over dignity's constitutional scope. However, there are two solutions to
this problem. First, despite the vigorous debates over dignity-based con-
stitutional issues, the Court generally does resolve these disputes. When
a Court majority chooses one entity's dignity over another, or strikes a
certain balance between them, the matter is also decided for purposes of
statutory interpretation. Second, if this method cannot dictate how to use
the dignity canon in a particular case-if a court encounters two irrecon-
cilably conflicted dignity interests-then the canon simply will not
apply.
Like other constitutionally derived canons, the dignity canon is de-
pendent at least in part on judges' views about the scope of the constitu-
tional value involved. Judges often disagree about which rights, or whose
316 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126 (1998).
317 Id. at 127.
318 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
319 See, e.g., Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028-29 (2016) (Alito, J., con-
curring in the judgment); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 2565-66 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 37-38, Voisine v. United States, No. 14-10154 (Feb. 29, 2016).
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rights, are covered by the Constitution's protection of dignity. Some
view abortion through the lens of the potential mother's dignity, 3 2 0 while
others elevate the dignity of the unborn fetus. 3 2 1 Some see striking down
gay marriage bans as affirming the dignity of the couples, 32 2 while others
see it as an affront to the dignity of those who voted for the bans. 3 2 3
Some find that laws allowing punitive damages for defamation of private
individuals serve a dignity interest more powerful than the First Amend-
ment interests of the press; 3 2 4 others do not.3 2 5 A dignity canon could
import these ideological fights over dignity, along with the concept of
dignity itself, from constitutional law into statutory interpretation. It is
also possible to find dignity interests on both sides of the same case-a
less-than-ideal situation for judges attempting to use the dignity canon.
We encountered this issue in Part II.B: it was one of the arguments coun-
seling against creating a dignity canon in the first place.
To illustrate this problem in greater detail, let us consider the issue
of affirmative action. Some Justices view the use of race in public school
admissions as both illegal and offensive. In their view, "it demeans the
dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his
or her own merit and essential qualities." 32 6 These jurists operate on a
color-blind vision of the Constitution, which requires that government
treat people similarly regardless of race. In this worldview, affirmative
action causes government to see people simply as members of a group,
rather than as individuals. This can be summed up in Chief Justice Rob-
erts' statement: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race." 327
Other Justices, by contrast, believe the Constitution allows affirma-
tive action under multiple theories. First, affirmative action helps "rem-
edy[ ] past discrimination." 3 28 Under this model, it is not color-blindness
that respects the individual dignity of minority applicants; rather, color-
blindness denies the unique history minorities have faced in this country
solely because of their status as members of a particular racial or ethnic
group. It is only by taking that history into account that we can get a full
picture of each applicant as an individual. Rather than rejecting a student
because of lower test scores, for instance, a college might recognize that
320 See supra notes 96, 100.
321 See supra note 101.
322 See supra note 7.
323 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
324 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 400-02 & n.42 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting).
325 See id. at 341-42, 349 (majority opinion).
326 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007).
327 Id. at 748.
328 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
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a student grew up as an African-American student in a school district or
in a city in which adults did not treat African-American students as capa-
ble of attending (or likely to attend) college because of a legacy of dis-
crimination. Delving more deeply beyond what, at first glance, appears
to be merely an unimpressive SAT score would do greater service to the
individual behind the numbers. Affirmative action, then, might better
serve human dignity than would color-blindness.
Alternatively, one can view affirmative action as a means of pursu-
ing schools' "compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body." 3 2 9
In particular, positive dignity effects arise out of attempts to produce
intra-group diversity. Only by reaching a "critical mass" of minority stu-
dents or workers can a school or employer provide enough unique exam-
ples of minority peers for the majority to see that those peers are not so
different from them, and that there are in fact greater differences between
individuals of a particular minority group than there are between those
individuals and the overall majority group.330 This realization "dimin-
ish[es] the force of [ ] stereotypes," something that schools and employ-
ers "cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students" or
workers. 33 1 Affirmative action thereby fuels the treatment of minority
peers as individuals, rather than as members of a strange and exogenous
group-which shows greater respect for dignity than would color-
blindness.
The Justices in the middle, including Justice O'Connor and Justice
Kennedy, have straddled the dignitary divide. They agree that remedying
past discrimination and increasing diversity are both compelling state in-
terests that can justify the use of race. 3 3 2 However, they oppose anything
that looks like racial quotas or "crude system[s] of individual racial clas-
sifications."3 3 3 The government must therefore be cautious when em-
ploying racial categories. This position is likewise defended on dignity
grounds. As Justice Kennedy puts it: "To be forced to live under a state-
mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in
our society." 334 This middle position, mostly by virtue of belonging to
the swing Justices, has essentially become the law of the land. 3 35
These different conceptions of constitutional dignity could well be
imported into statutory interpretation. In this and other areas, the canon
329 Id.
330 Id. at 332
331 Id. at 333.
332 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Grutter,
539 U.S. at 328; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
333 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72 (2003).
334 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 798.
335 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), aff'd, 136 S.
Ct. 2198 (2016).
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would point in opposite directions depending on the prevailing ideology.
For instance, some judges would read ambiguous statutes as prohibiting
affirmative action, in order to preserve minority students' or employees'
dignity. Other judges would read those same statutes to allow affirmative
action, based on the same premise. If one finds these battles problematic
in constitutional law, the prospect of seeing them expand to statutory
interpretation might be distressing.
However, as the discussion in Part I.B shows, dignity has a settled
place in constitutional jurisprudence. Despite strong resistance, the Court
has extended its use of dignity to protect homosexual relationships, 336
allow early-stage abortions, 337 and outlaw the death penalty in a number
of situations. 338 In these cases we find an enduring, if at times narrow,
majority in favor of one view of dignity over another. The dignity of gay
marriage defeats the dignity of the legislatures that banned it and the
individuals who opposed it; the dignity of a mother deciding how to con-
trol her body defeats the dignity of a pre-viability fetus; the dignity of
death row inmates defeats the dignity of the polities that decided their
conduct made them deserving of death. Even in more complex areas,
such as affirmative action, the swing Justices have carved out consensus
positions balancing the dignity values at issue, and lower courts must
follow these intermediate views. 3 3 9
336 Compare, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) ("They ask for
equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right."), with id. at 2612
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The majority's decision is an act of will, not legal judgment. The
right it announces has no basis in the Constitution or this Court's precedent."), and id. at 2631
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[The Court's decision] rejects the idea-captured in our Declaration
of Independence-that human dignity is innate and suggests instead that it comes from the
Government.").
337 Compare, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
("These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment."), and id. at 870 ("We conclude the line should be drawn at
viability, so that before that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her preg-
nancy."), with id. at 983 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best the Court can do to explain how it
is that the word 'liberty' must be thought to include the right to destroy human fetuses is to
rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a politi-
cal choice.").
338 Compare, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) ("By protecting even
those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the govern-
ment to respect the dignity of all persons."), and id. at 578 ("The Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of
18 when their crimes were committed."), with id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Because I do
not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning of other
provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members
of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.").
339 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 642-44 (5th Cir. 2014),
affd, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
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Similarly, a court in a statutory interpretation case must adhere to
the dignity interest, or balance of interests, privileged by the Supreme
Court's constitutional precedent. The problems posed by the dignity ca-
non are far from unique in statutory interpretation. Canon "duels," in
which the majority and dissent use the same canon to come to opposite
conclusions, are common at the Supreme Court level. The early Roberts
Court dueled over substantive canons in 6.8% of non-unanimous cases,
and it dueled over text and plain meaning-a category that appears to
include clear statement rules-in a whopping 42.7% of such cases. 34 0
Yet, in each of these instances, the Court ultimately decided the issue.
The majority's reading of a canon won the day. Because the dignity ca-
non is firmly rooted in constitutional norms, the Court's constitutional
cases provide a firmer rule of decision than one can hope for with most
other canons. Thus, even if competing dignity interests present them-
selves, the dignity canon will favor one over the other. If one respects the
basic legitimacy of the Supreme Court majority decisions--even some-
times-shifting, five-to-four decisions-then one can easily resolve these
rare statutory fights.
Of course, appeals to precedent will not always solve the problem.
Sometimes a statutory case will wade into an area that the Court has not
specifically addressed, with valid dignity interests on both sides. And, in
a very small percentage of cases, one will find that the Court has ad-
dressed the issue, but has struck a balance between dignity interests that
could be difficult for the dignity canon to sort out. Late-term abortions
provide a ready example of this sort of case. In Gonzales v. Carhart, the
Court rejected a facial challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Act. 34 1 In
the process, it balanced the dignity interest inherent in the abortion right,
as described in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, against "the dignity of
human life" represented by the fetuses that were killed during the proce-
dure the statute banned. 342 This is a complicated standard that must take
into consideration whether a particular method is necessary to protect the
woman's health, and whether there are alternative procedures
available. 343
While it may be possible to use a dignity clear statement rule in
areas like this, the competing dignity interests are strong and relatively
equally matched. In these situations, the dignity canon would simply
"run out." Like an algebraic equation in which one discovers that the
same variable appears on both sides, one dignity interest would cancel
out the other. When this occurs, courts would have to use other canons to
340 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DuKE L.J. 910, 929 tab.1 (2016).
341 550 U.S. 124, 156 (2007).
342 Id. at 157-58.
343 Id. at 166-67.
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interpret the statute; the dignity canon could not apply. This situation,
however, would be quite rare. In the vast majority of cases, the dignity
canon would operate as normal.
CONCLUSION
This Article has laid out the case for a dignity canon of statutory
interpretation. It has shown that the protection of human dignity suffuses
constitutional law, and that this strong constitutional value can be im-
ported into statutory cases as a clear statement rule. By requiring legisla-
tures to draft laws in the shadow of dignitary interests, the canon could
play a major role in legislative activity. As the examples in Part m show,
it would certainly play a major role in litigation, with the power to
change outcomes in major cases. After the structural revolution of the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, the focus on the individual that drove so
many statutory cases in the Warren and Burger Court years has dimin-
ished. It is my hope that judges, clerks, and members of the legal acad-
emy will consider this Article's modest proposal, and bring a long-
needed focus on individual rights and freedoms back to the interpretation
of statutes.
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